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IN RE DEEPWATER HORIZON AND THE NEED TO 
CLEAN UP RULE 23(B)(3) CERTIFICATION 
JURISPRUDENCE THROUGH LEGISLATION 
 
David Inkeles* 
 
The certification stage is considered the main event in class 
action litigation. Every class seeking damages must satisfy Rule 
23(b)(3) prior to judicial approval. Yet the federal circuits have 
been unclear as to how much proof class members must show in 
order to satisfy the Rule. A number of circuits have certified 
classes for plaintiffs who either cannot show, or cannot possibly 
plead, a legal injury. Other circuits have required a more rigorous 
Rule 23(b)(3) showing. While the Supreme Court has provided 
some guidance on this matter, the split between the circuits is alive 
and well. This Note suggests amending existing legislation—the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005—in an attempt to bring some 
clarity to the Rule 23(b)(3) landscape. In doing so, plaintiffs, 
defendants, the courts, and the class action vehicle, will all benefit. 
                                                            
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2016; B.A., Skidmore College, 2011. I 
would like to thank the Journal staff for their edits, and patience, while working 
with me on each draft.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Both commentators1 and the Supreme Court2 recognize that 
“many companies justifiably fear class actions, and with good 
reason.”3 Increasingly, most class actions that survive the class 
certification stage4 end in settlement.5 This makes the certification 
determination the defining moment in a class action’s life.6 A 
court’s denial of certification “can be the ‘death knell’ of the 
                                                            
1 See Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class 
Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the 
Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 546 (2006); Kent A. Lambert 
Class Action Settlements in Louisiana, 61 LA. L. REV. 89, 131–133 (2000) 
(observing the “unprecedented extortive leverage” that class action suits can 
have on defendants). 
2 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 
(2011) (“[W]hen damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential 
claimants are aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error will often 
become unacceptable. Faced with even a small chance of devastating loss, 
defendants will be pressured into settling questionable claims.”); Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[T]he threat of discovery 
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases.”).  
3 Robert W. Wood, Defining Employees and Independent Contractors: 
Don’t Try This at Home!, BUS. L. TODAY, May–June 2008, at 45, 48. 
4 Class certification is the initial step the plaintiff(s) seeking to bring a class 
action must satisfy in order to “aggregate their claims and proceed as a class 
against a common defendant.” Ryan Patrick Phair, Resolving the “Choice-Of-
Law Problem” in Rule 23(b)(3) Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
835, 835 (2010). 
5 Robert G. Bone & David E. Evans, Class Certification and the 
Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1291 (2002) (“[T]he vast majority of 
certified class actions settle, most soon after certification.”). 
6  
For class members, a favorable certification decision can mean 
greater litigating power and enhanced settlement leverage. 
And, for the defendant, certification can mean the difference 
between facing a massive and essentially uninsurable liability 
risk in one suit or a more manageable series of risks in 
individual suits. Because strategic implications are so 
substantial, parties today invest a great deal in litigating 
certification motions. 
Id. at 1262–63. 
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case.”7 Conversely, an affirmative grant may “create such a death 
threat to [the] defendant that settlement is her only option.”8  
The federal circuits are deeply divided, however, as to one 
significant issue that figures prominently in class certification 
decisions and, by implication, settlement.  There is no consensus as 
to whether, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,9 courts may certify a class that includes a plurality of 
members who have not, individually, pled facts sufficient to 
demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct caused their injuries. 
Courts in the D.C., Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits decline 
certification when the putative class contains members who cannot 
trace their injuries to the defendant’s actions.10 Yet the Second, 
Third, and Fifth Circuits have followed a less rigorous standard, 
granting certification even when significant portions of the class 
include plaintiffs unable to allege a colorable claim.11   
                                                            
7 Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: 
Scrutinizing the Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 325 
(2011); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared To Death”: Class Certification and 
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003). 
8 Id. 
9 Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that “a 
class action may be maintained if,” along with satisfying Rule 23(a),  
[T]he court finds that the questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that class action is superior to other 
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include: 
(d) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
10 See Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 780–81 (8th Cir. 
2013); Bussey v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 F. App’x 782, 788 
(11th Cir. 2014); In re Rail Freight Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 252 
(D.C. Cir. 2013). 
11 See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 242–43 (2d Cir. 
2012) (holding that “a settlement class’s failure to satisfy the fraud-on-the-
market presumption does not necessarily preclude a finding of predominance”); 
Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 304 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that, under 
Rule 23(b)(3) and Third Circuit precedent, certification of a class is proper 
without requiring individual class members to state a valid legal claim); In re 
Deepwater Horizon, 744 F.3d 370, 380 (5th Cir. 2014) (Dennis, J., concurring) 
(claimants were not required to prove their claims using trial-type evidence that 
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This Note focuses primarily on two recent Fifth Circuit 
decisions. Each decision involved litigation that arose out of the 
2010 Deepwater Horizon12 oil spill. The first decision, in January 
2014, held that Rule 23(b)(3)13 was met despite noting that 
members of the class were not required to submit evidence of 
damages.14 In March, the Fifth Circuit held that class members 
were not required to prove their claims using trial-type evidence to 
trace their alleged damages to the spill.15  
Congress must put forth a uniform pleading standard as to the 
level of proof of injury that class members must show in order to 
meet Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. Congress can 
accomplish this by amending existing legislation—the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005.16 Providing clarity in this context will 
benefit class members17 and defendants,18 and increase the 
                                                            
showed their injuries were traceable to the spill). 
12 Deepwater Horizon, which will be used interchangeably with the “BP 
Oil Spill,” refers to the April 2010 explosion of a British Petroleum (BP) mobile 
offshore drilling unit in the Gulf of Mexico, which killed eleven workers, and 
resulted in “the Nation’s largest oil spill ever, with substantial environmental 
and economic impacts.” Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer 
Continental Shelf—Increased Safety Measures for Energy Development on the 
Outer Continental Shelf, 75 Fed. Reg. 63346, 63354 (Oct. 14, 2010) (to be 
codified at 30 CFR Part 250).  
13 Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  
14 In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 815–19 
(5th Cir. 2014).  
15 In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon III), 744 F.3d 370, 380 
(5th Cir. 2014).  
16 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15, 2071). 
17 The Supreme Court has recognized the need for heightened scrutiny at 
certification in order to ensure that plaintiffs are not burdened by overbroad 
class definitions, acknowledging that, when faced with settlement certification 
questions, courts “need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present 
intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be no trial” 
but, at the same time, “other specifications of the Rule [23]—those designed to 
protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions— 
demand undiluted, even heightened, attention.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997); see also Robert G. Bone, Sorting Through 
the Certification Muddle, 63 VAND. L. REV. 105, 112–13 (2010) (describing the 
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viability of the class action vehicle going forward by ensuring that 
Rule 23(b)(3)’s aims of equity, uniformity of result, and efficiency 
are pursued.19  
Part I of this Note provides a primer on class actions and the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). Part II focuses on 
the Deepwater Horizon litigation, beginning at the district court 
level and tracing two decisions to the Fifth Circuit. Part III 
discusses the implications of these decisions and assesses the two 
competing approaches the circuits currently follow as to Rule 
23(b)(3) certification. This discussion will show how the approach 
taken by the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits is inconsistent with 
CAFA and the Supreme Court’s precedent.  
Part IV discusses the preliminary concerns that the CAFA 
amendment must consider. This includes a discussion of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) of 1995.20 
The PSLRA, which added a heightened pleading standard to 
securities fraud cases, will be useful in thinking about whether and 
how to draft the proposed amendment. Part V will conclude by 
urging Congress to adopt a modified Individualized Proof 
standard, currently utilized by the D.C., Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits. It will describe the specific components of this standard 
and the necessity that it includes exceptions for certain types of 
class actions. In setting this standard, Congress would not only 
support the central aims of CAFA and Rule 23(b)(3) but would 
codify a fair and consistent standard in an area of uncertain 
jurisprudence.21   
                                                            
social costs associated with erroneous certifications). 
18 See Bone, supra note 17, at 110  (describing how tightening the standard 
of proof can work to avoid certification of meritless or weak class actions and 
thereby reduce the pressure on defendants to settle). 
19 As the advisory committee’s comments to Rule 23(b)(3) make clear, the 
viability of class actions depends on achieving “economies of time, effort, and 
expense, and [promoting] uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, 
without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable 
results.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966).  
20 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
21 Two of Congress’s stated purposes behind CAFA were to “assure fair 
and prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims,” and to 
“benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices.” 
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I. CLASS ACTION PRIMER (POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND CAFA) 
 
The following discussion begins with the policy goals that 
underlie class actions. It will then describe procedural 
requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b). Part 
I.C provides background on the Class Action Fairness Act, its 
drafters’ goals, and its impact on class action litigation. This will 
show how the Act’s omission of a pleading standard has led to 
inconsistent approaches from the circuits. Part I concludes with the 
Supreme Court’s recent attempts to resolve the issues surrounding 
Rule 23(b)(3) class action certification.  
 
A. Representative Litigation: Policy Rationales Underlying 
the Class Action 
 
The class action device provides a vehicle for the aggregation 
of claims among individual but similarly situated plaintiffs when 
case-by-case litigation may be impractical or inefficient.22 In 
aggregating a suit that thousands of individuals may be unwilling 
or unable to pursue on their own, class actions promote important 
policy goals, including the compensation of victims and the 
deterrence of bad actors.23 Professor Howard M. Erichson refers to 
                                                            
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note). Rule 23(b)(3) seeks to promote 
efficient, fair, and consistent judicial decision-making where numerous small 
claims could be aggregated into class actions; but it is likely not appropriate 
where the “individual stakes are high and disparities among class members are 
great.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625 (citing Fed. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory 
committees notes (1966)). 
22 Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Essentials of Democratic Mass Litigation, 45 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 499, 503 (2012) (“At its best, mass litigation can be 
utilized to promote and protect democratic principles not only when consumer 
rights or public health and safety are at issue, but when the case implicates 
fundamental human rights.”). See also Megan E. Barriger, Due Process 
Limitations on Rule 23(b)(2) Monetary Remedies: Examining the Source of the 
Limitation in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 619, 622 
(2012) (“Class actions allow plaintiffs to pool claims that would otherwise not 
be litigated due to their small size or where joinder of all interested parties 
would be impractical.”). 
23 See HOWARD M. ERICHSON, INSIDE CIVIL PROCEDURE: WHAT MATTERS 
AND WHY 181 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter ERICHSON, CIVIL 
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class actions as “representative litigation” because of their 
potential to bind individuals who do not participate in the litigation 
but are nevertheless sufficiently similar to the class 
representative(s).24  It is therefore vital that legitimate plaintiffs, 
both named and absent members of the class, are not encumbered 
by an overbroad or diluted class definition.25 In order to 
accomplish these goals, the law places a series of procedural 
requirements that a prospective class must satisfy before 
proceeding to litigation.26 
 
B. Certification Procedures  
 
Class certification is governed by Rules 23(a) and (b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.27 If potential plaintiffs can 
satisfy these Rules, their class will be certified. Individual 
members, along with their claims, will then be aggregated for 
litigation.28  
 
1. Rule 23(a) and “Mandatory Class Actions” under 
Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) 
 
The initial step in class certification is meeting the general 
requirements of Rule 23(a).29 The prospective class must then 
                                                            
PROCEDURE] (describing the policies furthered by class action litigation).  
24 Id. 
25 The inability to re-define a class once it has been certified requires 
“undiluted, even heightened, attention” to the characteristics of the class at the 
Rule 23 stage. See Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? 
We’ll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1779 (1997) (quoting Amchem , 521 U.S. at 620). 
26 ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 181. 
27 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b); ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 
23, at 182–83. 
28 ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 182. 
29 Under Rule 23(a), every potential class must satisfy each of four general 
prerequisites: (1) numerosity, which requires that the number of potential 
plaintiffs makes joinder impracticable; (2) commonality, which ensures that 
“questions of law or fact common to the class” exist; (3) typicality, in that “the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of claims or defenses 
of the class”; and (4) adequacy of representation, which ensures that lead 
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demonstrate that it satisfies one of three categories of class actions 
under Rule 23(b).30 The first two categories are 23(b)(1) and 
(b)(2).31 Although “distinct under the Rules,” these first two 
categories “have largely merged with each other.”32 Actions 
brought under both (b)(1) and (b)(2) are referred to as “mandatory 
class actions.”33 Once certified, members cannot opt out of the 
class, and as a result, (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions include a “more 
flexible notice provision” for absentees.34 In contrast, Rule 
23(b)(3) classes provide absentees the right to opt out and are 
characterized by a “more stringent notice requirement.”35  
 
2. Rule 23(b)(3): Damages Class Actions and 
Predominance Requirement 
 
The Supreme Court has referred to Rule 23(b)(3) as an 
“adventuresome innovation.”36 It is designed for cases where class 
treatment is not “as clearly called for” as it is under (b)(1) or 
                                                            
plaintiffs represent absent class members in a fair and adequate manner. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4); ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 
182–83. 
30 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 
183. 
31 Rule 23(b)(1) permits certification when prosecuting separate actions by 
individual members would create “incompatible standards of conduct,” or when 
pursuing separate actions would “substantially impair or impede” the class 
members’ ability to protect their interests. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A), 
23(b)(1)(B). The second category, Rule 23(b)(2), pertains to class actions 
seeking injunctive or declaratory relief as opposed to money damages. Under 
this category, certification will be granted when the class can show that the 
defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 
class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).  
32 Jenna G. Farleigh, Note, Splitting the Baby: Standardizing Issue Class 
Certification, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1585, 1594 (2011) (citing RICHARD A. 
NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
195 (2009)).  
33 ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 184. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011) (citing 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997)).  
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(b)(2).37 Rule 23(b)(1) is used where individual adjudications are 
nearly impossible.38 Such may be the case when one party is 
“obliged by law to treat the members of the class alike.”39 Rule 
23(b)(2) applies to classes seeking injunctive relief, which will 
unavoidably affect the entire class in a similar manner.40 Rule 
23(b)(3), however, enables the class to seek individualized 
monetary relief, which will then be binding upon any member who 
does not opt out.41 It is common that a successful Rule 23(b)(3) 
class will win a single judgment, or, more likely, reach a settlement 
figure from the defendant, that is then apportioned to claimants on 
an individual basis, often by a claims administrator.42  
Greater procedural requirements have been established in order 
for a class to meet certification as a “damages” class under Rule 
23(b)(3).43 Principally, these are superiority and predominance.44 
The superiority requirement asks the court to consider whether “a 
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 
                                                            
37 Id. (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615).  
38 See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
39 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614. Examples include “a utility acting toward 
customers[,] a government imposing a tax[], or where the party must treat all 
alike as a matter of practical necessity.” Id. (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, 
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 388 (1967)). 
40 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). “‘Civil rights cases against parties charged 
with unlawful, class-based discrimination, are prime examples’ of what (b)(2) is 
meant to capture.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 
614). 
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 592 (describing 
that Rule 23(b)(3) permits “judgments for money that would bind all class 
members save those who opt out”).   
42 See Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 455, 466 n.56 (2011) (“[N]either defendants nor courts are 
generally involved with the individualized allocation of a total settlement 
amount or damages award among plaintiffs.”) (citing 7AA CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1784 (3d ed. 2005)).  
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558. 
44 ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 185; FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(3). There are also the aforementioned structural provisions that provide 
absentees with mandatory notice and the right to opt out of any damages class 
action certified under the Rule. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Wal-Mart, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2545.  
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efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”45 The predominance 
inquiry asks whether “questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members.”46 Generally, common questions pertain to the 
“defendant’s conduct and class-wide defenses.”47 Individual 
questions concern particular issues of causation and damages, as 
well as individual defenses by members of the class.48  
In many large class actions, there is an asymmetry between the 
common questions—the defendant’s liability—and the many 
individual questions about damages or causation pertaining to each 
member.49 This tension creates practical difficulties for courts as 
well as putative class plaintiffs.50 Courts must decide whether, and 
in how much detail, to scrutinize the merits of individual claims at 
the certification stage.51 Similarly, the class seeking certification 
must convince the court upon “some creditable basis” that “factual 
differences among the class members’ cases are minor and 
immaterial.”52 In practice, the degree of evidence that courts find 
sufficient to create this creditable basis varies among circuits.53 
This has contributed to an uneven field of Rule 23(b)(3) 
jurisprudence.54 This Note argues that clarity can be provided 
through amendment to the Class Action Fairness Act.  
                                                            
45 ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 185 (quoting Walmart, 
131 S. Ct. at 2545).  
46 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  
47 ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 185. 
48 Id. 
49 See Alex Parkinson, Comcast Corp v. Behrend and Chaos on the 
Ground, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1218 (2014) (describing that, in a mass tort 
class action, establishing the defendant’s negligence “will be nearly, if not 
exactly, identical” to evidence offered by any other claimant, while the question 
of damages will likely be unique to each member). 
50 Id. at 1217. 
51 See 6A STACY L. DAVIS, ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS 
EDITION §12:210 (2012). 
52 Id. 
53 See Farleigh, supra note 32, at 1588 (describing the variance among 
circuits in applying Rule 23 certification procedures).  
54 See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1613 (2008) [hereinafter Erichson, CAFA’s Impact] 
(describing the “disproportionate growth” in filings in circuits with more liberal 
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C. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
 
1. Federalizing Class Actions: CAFA’s Aims and 
Purposes 
 
The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) was enacted in 
2005.55 Predicated on strong tort reform56 overtones, CAFA was 
justified, in large part, upon the belief that the class action vehicle 
was being abused.57 For example, supporters of the legislation 
feared that plaintiffs could gain an unfair advantage over corporate 
defendants by cherry-picking particular state courts around the 
country where judges and juries were known to be unsympathetic 
to large commercial actors.58 In response, proponents of the bill 
believed that “federal courts could offer a safe haven”59 from what 
the American Tort Reform Association artfully dubbed “judicial 
hellholes.”60 In order to channel class claims from state courts into 
                                                            
certification standards).  
55 Nan S. Ellis, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Story Behind 
the Statute, 35 J. LEGIS. 76, 97 (2009). 
56 Tort reform, in its classical sense, seeks to minimize legal rules that are 
especially costly for defendants. See ‘Common Sense’ Legislation: The Birth of 
Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (1996) (“Classical tort 
reformers call for the elimination of legal rules that are particularly expensive 
for defendants.”).  When Republicans took over the House of Representatives in 
1994, one of the key components of the “Contract with America,” a ten-point 
series of legislative proposals, was passing tort reform legislation. Patrick 
Hoopes, Tort Reform in the Wake of United States v. Lopez, 24 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 785, 785 (1997). 
57 After a bipartisan Senate majority passed the bill, President G.W. Bush 
called CAFA a “strong step forward in our efforts to reform the litigation 
system,” noting that the legal system encouraged “junk lawsuits that 
undermine[d] confidence in our courts while hurting our economy, costing jobs, 
and threatening small businesses.” Statement on Senate Action on Class-Action 
Lawsuit Reform Legislation, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 227 (Feb. 10, 
2005)). 
58 See Cameron Fredman, Plaintiffs’ Paradise Lost: Diversity of 
Citizenship and Amount in Controversy Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2006) (describing the concerns of 
CAFA’s proponents). 
59 Id. at 1027–28.  
60 Victor E. Schwartz et al., Taking a Stand Against Lawlessness in 
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federal courts, CAFA makes three significant changes to class 
action procedure: it gives federal courts original jurisdiction over 
class actions,61 expands federal diversity jurisdiction pertaining to 
class actions, and updates procedures for settling class actions in 
federal court.62  
Section 2 of CAFA articulates the law’s findings and purposes. 
It is clear that the bill’s supporters were concerned with the 
economic costs associated with class actions.63 Legislators noted 
abuses of the class action vehicle over the prior decade that 
“harmed class members with legitimate claims and defendants that 
have acted responsibly,” and resulted in many class members 
receiving little or no benefit in cases where “unjustified awards are 
made to certain plaintiffs at the expense of other class members.”64 
Congress found that these “[a]buses . . . undermine the national 
judicial system, the free flow of interstate commerce.”65 
Accordingly, Section 2(b) declares that the purposes of CAFA are 
to: “assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with 
legitimate claims,” and “benefit society by encouraging innovation 
and lowering consumer prices.”66 
                                                            
American Courts: How Trial Court Judges and Appellate Justices Can Protect 
their Courts from Becoming Judicial Hellholes, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 215, 
216 (2004).  
61 Pursuant to CAFA, federal courts have original jurisdiction over class 
actions if minimal diversity is met, the class contains at least one hundred 
members, and the aggregate amount in controversy is at least $5,000,000. 
Patricia A. Seith, Civil Rights, Labor, and the Politics of Class Action 
Jurisdiction, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 91 (2011).  
62 Key settlement provisions include enhanced judicial scrutiny over 
“coupon settlements,” which allows the court to hold a hearing and issue written 
determination that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class 
members, as well as a notification provision, requiring the defendant to send 
notice to the appropriate state and federal official in each state where a class 
member resides.  See Linda Pissott Reig et al., The Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005: Overview, Historical Perspective, and Settlement Requirements, 40 TORT 
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1087, 1097–98 (2005) (summarizing CAFA and 
describing the three primary changes). 
63 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 
4, 4–5 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1711). 
64 Id. at 4. 
65 Id. at 5. 
66 Id. 
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2. CAFA’s Impact on Forum Shopping: Same Shopping, 
Different Shops 
 
In the years since its enactment, CAFA has faced a variety of 
criticisms.67 Some have argued that the law has unnecessarily 
increased burdens on bringing and certifying class actions.68 
Others have assailed CAFA as being predicated on anecdotal, 
overly cynical views toward class action plaintiffs and attorneys.69 
One thing is clear. Although CAFA has succeeded in funneling 
class actions to federal courts, it has not ameliorated the perceived 
abuses of the class action vehicle by way of forum shopping.70  
Shortly after CAFA’s enactment, Federal District Judge Sarah 
Vance portended that, “although Congress intended CAFA to 
eliminate ‘forum shopping’ in the class action arena, it is safe to 
predict that the parties will continue to engage in strategic behavior 
                                                            
67 See Archis A. Parasharami & Kevin S. Ranlett, The Class Action 
Fairness Act, Five Years Later, MAYER BROWN (Apr. 12, 2010), 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/news/The-Class-Action-Fairness-Act-five-years-
later-04-12-2010 (describing that, in the five years following its passage, 
CAFA’s intended reforms had “mixed success”).  
68 See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a 
Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2528 (2008) (arguing that CAFA’s 
minimal diversity requirements for removal, namely the application of multiple 
states’ laws to highly individualized issues across a class, results in 
manageability problems that prevent many class actions from being certified in 
federal court); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 729, 745 (2013) (“Federal courts have not simply heard and decided more 
cases as a result of Rule 23(f) and CAFA; they have adopted troublesome new 
standards applicable to plaintiffs seeking classwide relief.”). 
69 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in 
Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1448 (2008) 
(discussing that CAFA has been called “legislation by anecdote”); see also 
Erichson, CAFA’s Impact, supra note 54, at 1596 (arguing that proponents of 
CAFA were motivated by a “mistrust of class action lawyers” and “successfully 
portrayed class action lawyers as opportunistic aggregators who get rich on 
litigation of their own making”). 
70 Parasharami & Ranlett, supra note 67 (“That CAFA has shifted many 
cases from state to federal court does not mean that forum-shopping has ceased . 
. . plaintiffs’ attorneys have adapted by choosing to file suit in particular federal 
courts . . . where the law is particularly favorable to class certification.”).  
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when it comes to choosing a forum.”71 Preserving elements of 
strategic behavior is important for maintaining the adversarial 
nature of litigation. But when the circuits vary in evaluating critical 
questions of proof at the class certification stage, all participants in 
the litigation face a troublesome degree of uncertainty. This 
demands legislative clarity in order to serve the policy goals that 
CAFA and the class action vehicle are designed to serve.   
 
3. “A Maze of Ambiguity”:72 The Problem of No Clear 
Standard in a Post-CAFA World 
 
CAFA’s express legislative intent demonstrates two prominent 
aims. First, the law provides a guarantee that legitimately harmed 
class members can receive fair and prompt adjudication through 
the class action vehicle.73 Second, the law provides an assurance 
that defendants responsible for compensating these harms do not 
suffer unnecessary losses by overcompensating or paying for 
meritless claims.74 Yet, omitted from the Act are means through 
which courts can ensure that these aims are achieved. Nowhere in 
the law is there a procedural standard that ensures a causal 
relationship between each plaintiff’s alleged injury and the 
defendant’s conduct.75   
                                                            
71 Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 
TUL. L. REV. 1617, 1642 (2006). Judge Vance appears to be correct. In 2007, the 
Federal Judicial Center released a preliminary study assessing CAFA’s impact 
on channeling state-law classes into federal courts. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact, 
supra note 54, at 1607–08. This data not only showed an increase in the number 
of class actions both filed and removed to federal courts, but that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys filed originally in the most favorable federal forums. Id. at 1613 
(“Given lawyers’ perception of the Ninth Circuit as relatively liberal on class 
certification, the disproportionate growth of filings in its districts should come as 
no surprise . . . . The growth was much smaller in the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.”). 
72 Farleigh, supra note 32, at 1588. 
73 Congress explicitly sought to “assure fair and prompt recoveries for class 
members with legitimate claims.” Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-2, § 2(b), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1711). 
74 Congress’s stated purpose was to “benefit society by encouraging 
innovation and lowering consumer prices.” Id.  
75 See Kevin Tamm, The Class Action Fairness Act and Colorable Reasons 
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As a result of Congress’s failure to articulate a standard, 
“[l]itigants seeking class certification still muddle through a maze 
of ambiguity.”76 The principles of proof followed by a particular 
circuit will determine the issue of certification as well as the size of 
the class with which a defendant will likely seek to negotiate in 
settlement proceedings. When these principles vary significantly, 
many of the concerns that precipitated CAFA’s enactment still 
remain intact.  
Yet drafters of the Act may have been wary of including a “one 
size fits all” standard of proof due to concerns of impracticability. 
Class action litigation arises in a wide range of contexts, with 
issues of proof varying greatly depending upon the type of harm 
alleged and the size of the proposed class. For example, while 
securities fraud cases may typically advance past the certification 
stage, Title VII claims face a steeper burden in meeting Rule 23’s 
commonality and predominance requirements.77  
In a securities fraud action involving a security traded on a 
public exchange, courts have held the overarching finding of 
reliance sufficient to fulfill Rule 23(b)(3).78 In such cases, classes 
                                                            
for Separate Class Actions, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 313, 329 (2012). The act does not 
address the proper standard of proof or pleading required to bring a class action. 
Id. A statute predicated on removing class actions to federal court, CAFA was 
notably ambiguous on the question of which party has the burden of proof to 
establish damages exceeding the amount in controversy necessary for diversity 
jurisdiction. Id. 
76 Farleigh, supra note 32, at 1588. 
77 See Klonoff, supra note 68, at 824 (“[S]ecurities fraud suits involving 
securities traded on a major stock exchange are commonly certified. Such cases 
tend to involve overarching issues that impact all class members, and seek 
damages that can be easily calculated.”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011) (denying certification in an employment discrimination 
class action, and holding that in certification of Title VII claims, “[w]ithout 
some glue holding together the alleged reasons for those [employment] 
decisions, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ 
claims will produce a common answer to the crucial discrimination question”).  
78 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184–85 
(2011); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988); In re Bank of Am. 
Corp. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 281 F.R.D. 134, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(citing authority that in these “fraud on the market” cases, once “‘liability can be 
determined on a class-wide basis, individualized damage issues are not 
ordinarily a bar to class certification’”) (citation omitted). 
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will be certified if plaintiffs can satisfy the rebuttable presumption 
that they relied upon the defendant’s deceptive acts in making the 
relevant transaction.79 If this is done, class plaintiffs need not prove 
“loss causation”—that the defendant’s conduct or misconduct in 
fact caused the economic loss complained of.80 In contrast, some 
courts impose a steeper certification burden in cases alleging 
disparate treatment employment discrimination under Title VII.81 
In Title VII cases, the alleged harm is that a class of employees 
was discriminated against on the basis of their membership in a 
protected class.82 But successful certification demands the plaintiff 
to show that the employer subjected members of the class to a 
“pattern or practice of intentional discriminatory treatment.”83 
Naturally, these showings become difficult to make when “overt 
acts of employment discrimination are relatively rare,” and 
practices take on “more subtle if no less invidious forms.”84 
Recognizing these differences, some commentators have eschewed 
arguments advancing a uniform standard and instead have urged 
that a more flexible approach is optimal.85  
A more flexible approach would permit judges to exercise 
discretion in determining whether Rule 23’s requirements are met, 
depending on the unique characteristics or category of the claim.86 
                                                            
79 Erica P. John Fund, 131 S. Ct. at 2182; Basic, 485 U.S. at 250. Each 
plaintiff doesn’t individually have to prove that they actually relied on the 
deceptive acts. Erica P. John Fund, 131 S. Ct. at 2185. Instead, as long as the 
misrepresentation is reflected in the market price, there is a presumption of 
reliance. Id. 
80 Erica P. John Fund, 131 S. Ct. 2179. This is in part because, once 
reliance is shown, issues of individual damages are readily susceptible to 
calculation. Klonoff, supra note 68, at 824–25 (“Such cases tend to involve 
overarching issues that impact all class members, and seek damages that can be 
easily calculated.”). 
81 Note, Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 619, 620 (1986).  
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 628. 
84 Id. 
85 See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 1897 (2014) (arguing that district courts should exercise 
pragmatic discretion in deciding to certify a class). 
86 See L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class 
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Yet this suggestion would likely contribute to the divergent 
approaches among the circuits and the problems associated with 
forum shopping.87 This is certainly the case in multi-district, 
national, or interstate litigation, where the availability of a “single 
positive trumps all the negatives.”88 A decision to certify a 
nationwide 23(b)(3) class binds the representative plaintiffs and 
absentees that are similarly situated.89 But a denial of certification 
will not produce the same permanent effect since the plaintiffs may 
subsequently seek certification in state court or other circuit 
courts.90 Thus, although a majority of courts might find 
certification inappropriate, plaintiffs can still file in other courts, 
strategically choosing those with more amenable Rule 23(b)(3) 
certification standards. All that is needed then is one “positive” 
result and a nationwide class is certified.91 
                                                            
Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, LA. L. REV. 157, 
165 (2004) (“Without including flexibility that permits judges to use judicial 
discretion in managing a mass tort according to its unique characteristics, 
reforms that purport to overhaul the system of mass torts have not succeeded.”).  
87 As the following section discusses, under a flexible approach, Courts 
have proven incapable of applying standards that are remotely consistent, 
allowing class counsel to select the most favorable forum to file their claims. See 
also Erichson, CAFA’s Impact, supra note 54, at 1613 (describing how lawyers’ 
perceptions of a given circuit’s certification procedures effect filing).  
88 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 
766–67 (7th Cir. 2003).  
89 See ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 183 (describing the 
binding impact of an affirmative certification grant.). In a damages class, these 
members may opt-out, whereas members of a class certified under (b)(1) or 
(b)(2) cannot. Id. at 182–84; see also Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 
2380 (2011) (“Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may 
bind nonparties. What does have this effect is a class action approval.”) 
(emphasis added).   
90 In Smith v. Bayer Corp., the Supreme Court unanimously held that 
federal court denial of certification is an improper basis to preclude absent 
members of the uncertified class from seeking certification of the same class in 
state court. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. at 2373; see also JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, 1 
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:16 (11th ed. 2014). 
91 In a pre-CAFA decision, Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook used an 
illustrative example to highlight this notion. Although Easterbrook was 
addressing this problem in state courts, his observation rings true with regard to 
federal circuits in a post-CAFA world. First, he posited to “[s]uppose that every 
state in the nation . . . deem[s] inappropriate a nationwide class” related to a 
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D. Wal-Mart, Comcast, and the Supreme Court’s Attempts to 
Resolve the Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance Analysis 
 
Still, commentators in favor of a uniform standard believe that 
the Supreme Court, rather than Congress, is the appropriate body 
to clarify these issues.92 If the present circuit split and the Fifth 
Circuit’s BP decisions are any indication, however, judicial 
discretion does not appear to be the solution. Before addressing 
these cases, it is important to set the stage with two recent Supreme 
Court decisions regarding Rule 23(b)(3) analysis. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes93 and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend94 provide this 
necessary backdrop.  
In Wal-Mart, current and former female employees brought a 
class action against the retail giant on behalf of nearly 1.5 million 
plaintiffs.95 The class alleged that Wal-Mart’s hiring and 
promotion practices discriminated against women in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.96 As with the BP 
litigation, the critical question was whether individual issues 
pertaining to the putative class were so central as to preclude 
certification.97 The Court found that the members failed to prove 
that common questions of law or fact—namely, the pattern or 
practices of discrimination—predominated over any questions 
affecting individual members.98 The Supreme Court held “Rule 23 
does not set forth a mere pleading standard . . . certification must 
                                                            
particular set of claims or products. Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 766. In 
practice, this would yield “something like ‘9 of 10 judges in every state’” or in 
federal courts, “3 of 4 judges,” to rule against certifying the potential class. Id. 
He went on to explain that “[a]lthough the 10% that see things otherwise are a 
distinct minority, one is bound to turn up if plaintiffs file enough suits—and, if 
one nationwide class is certified, then all the no-certification decisions fade into 
insignificance.” Id.  
92 E.g.,Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 149, 157 (2010) [hereinafter Nagareda, Common 
Answers]. 
93 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
94 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
95 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 2556–57. 
98 Id. 
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affirmatively demonstrate [the party’s] compliance with the 
Rule—that is, [the party] must be prepared to prove that there are 
in fact . . .common questions of law or fact.”99  
In Comcast, a group of cable television subscribers sought 
certification under 23(b)(3) of an antitrust class action against 
Comcast Corporation.100 The class alleged that Comcast had 
entered into unlawful “swap” agreements101 with regional 
competitors in violation of federal antitrust laws.102 The issue 
before the Supreme Court was whether the common question of 
liability sufficiently predominated over any individual damages 
issues across the class.103 Specifically, the Court considered 
whether a district court could certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) 
“without resolving whether the plaintiff class ha[s] introduced 
admissible evidence . . . to show that the case is susceptible to 
awarding damages on a class-wide basis.”104 Denying certification, 
the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must demonstrate a reliable, 
non-speculative, model for quantifying damages on a class-wide 
basis to meet Rule 23(b)(3).105 The Court reiterated that inquiry 
into these models may often require rigorous analysis of the 
underlying merits.106 
 
II. THE IN RE DEEPWATER HORIZON DECISIONS & THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
As the following discussion will demonstrate, courts have been 
inconsistent in their application of the Supreme Court’s recent 
Rule 23(b)(3) jurisprudence. The Fifth Circuit’s In re Deepwater 
                                                            
99 Id. at 2551. 
100 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1430 (2013).  
101 Id. at 1430. This practice would consist of Comcast “exchanging its 
television operations in different regions with those of competitors” in another 
consolidated region. Parkinson, supra note 49, at 1220.  
102 Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1430. 
103 Id. at 1431 n.4. 
104 Id.  
105 See id. at 1433. 
106 Id. at 1432; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 
(2011).  
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Horizon decisions highlight the problems in relying on and 
applying judicial precedent in this area.  
 
A. Background: The Spill and In Re Deepwater Horizon 
District Court Decisions 
 
On April 20, 2010 an oilrig belonging to British Petroleum 
(BP) exploded in the Gulf of Mexico.107  This explosion resulted in 
eleven deaths108 and spewed millions of barrels of oil into the 
Gulf.109  As a result of this event, thousands of individuals and 
businesses filed claims against BP.110 These claims ranged from 
cleanup workers’ personal injury claims to hotels’ lost business 
allegations.111 In August 2010, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation112 consolidated all federal claims pertaining to the spill 
                                                            
107 Campbell Robertson & Leslie Kaufman, Size of Spill in Gulf of Mexico 
Is Larger Than Thought, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/us/29spill.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
108 Id. 
109 Richard Thompson, Determining How Much Oil Spilled from BP’s Gulf 
Well ‘Not an Easy Task,’ Judge Says, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 27, 2013, 
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oilspill/index.ssf/2013/06/determining_how_ 
much_oil_spill.html (noting the difficulty in pinpointing an exact figure, but 
describing that estimates have ranged from 3.26–5.5 million barrels of oil spilled 
as a result of the accident). 
110 Kathy Finn, BP Oil Spill Claims Chief Braces for Surge in Filings, 
INSURANCE J., May 17, 2013, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/ 
2013/05/17/292400.htm (citing BP Claims Administrator noting that, as of May 
15, 2013, 165,877 claims were filed, of which 40,970 were eligible for 
payment).  
111 Douglas McCollam, The Other Oil Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/magazine/07oil-
t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing the various groups of claimants who 
had filed claims against BP).  
112 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, consisting of seven sitting 
federal judges, determines whether multidistrict litigation should be 
consolidated to a particular district court. Overview of Panel, UNITED STATES 
JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/ 
panel-info/overview-panel. These procedures are codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1407, 
which allows civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact that 
are pending in multiple districts to be centralized to any “district for coordinated 
or consolidated pretrial proceedings.” Id. The Panel also selects the judge or 
judges to administer the proceedings. Id.  
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(excluding securities suits) into one action.113 This included 
seventy-seven actions that were initially filed in seven federal 
courts.114 Most of these claims, the Panel recognized, were 
“comprised largely of putative class actions seeking recovery for 
property damage and other economic losses.”115 After recognizing 
that the Eastern District of Louisiana represented the closest 
jurisdiction to “the geographic and psychological ‘center of 
gravity,’”116 all claims were transferred to District Judge Carl 
Barbier of that court.117  
On October 19, 2010, the district court issued a Pretrial Order 
that created “pleading bundles” for each type of claim.118 The most 
important subclass for this Note is the “B1 bundle,” or the 
Business and Economic Loss (“BEL”) claimants.119 This group 
consists of all private, non-governmental claims for economic loss 
                                                            
113 In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 
20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900 (E.D. La. 2012).   
114 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., 
on Apr. 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2010). Thirty-one 
actions were filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana, twenty-three in the 
Southern District of Alabama, ten in the Northern District of Florida, eight in the 
Southern District of Mississippi, two in the Western District of Louisiana, two in 
the Southern District of Texas, and one in the Northern District of Alabama. Id. 
115 Id. at 1354. 
116 Id. at 1355. 
117 In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 900. 
118 Id. Some bundles were created based upon the type of plaintiff 
involved—for example, private individuals versus emergency responders—
while others were designated based upon the nature of the injury. Edward F. 
Sherman, The BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving Supervision of Multidistrict 
Litigation Judges, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 237, 240 (2011); Cent. for Biological 
Diversity, Inc. v. BP America Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 432 (2013). Rule 
16(c)(2)(L) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enables a court to create 
these bundles as a judicial management tool. See 5 Bus. & Com. Litig. Fed. Cts. 
§ 60:5 (3d ed. 2014) (describing that the Fifth Circuit relied on the Rule in 
upholding the use of pleading bundles in the BP litigation). 
119 Pretrial Order No. 11 [Case Management Order No. 1] at 3, In re Oil 
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 
2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012) (MDL No. 2179) [hereinafter Pretrial 
Order No. 11], available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/ 
Orders/PTO11.pdf. 
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and property damages.120 On August 13, 2012 the BEL claimants 
moved to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3).121  
 
1. The District Court’s Rule 23 Certification Decision  
 
On December 21, 2012, the district court certified the BEL 
claimants pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3).122 The class was 
defined as: individuals123 and entities124 that were (1) within one of 
several geographic areas within two years of the spill125 and, (2) 
whose claims met at least one of fifteen Damage Categories.126 In 
                                                            
120 In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 900–01; Pretrial Order No. 
11, supra note 119, at 3. 
121 In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 902–03. 
122 Id. at 913. 
123 The court defined “individuals” to include “all Natural Persons” who, 
“at any time between April 20, 2010 and April 16, 2012, lived in, worked in, 
were offered and accepted work in, owned or leased real or personal property 
located within, or owned or leased or worked on a vessel harbored or home 
ported” in one of the geographical areas. Id. at 965–66.  
124 The court defined this term to include “all entities doing business or 
operating” in the geographic areas that “at any time from April 20, 2010 to April 
16, 2012, owned, operated, or leased a physical facility” in the area and sold 
products in the area directly to consumers, end users, or other entities, or entities 
that “regularly purchased seafood harvested from specified gulf waters in order 
to produce goods for resale.” Id. at 966. “Entities” were also defined as any 
service business with “one or more full-time employees (including owner-
operators) who performed their full-time services” while present in the areas 
between the relevant time period, as well as any entities doing business that 
“owned, operated, or leased a vessel” home ported in the area, or landed seafood 
in the area, or which “owned or leased real property in the area” between April 
20, 2010 to April 16, 2012. Id. 
125 The areas cover the entire states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Alabama, as well as thirty counties in Florida, four counties in Texas, and “all 
adjacent Gulf waters, bays, estuaries, straits, and other tidal or brackish waters” 
within Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and described counties of Texas and 
Florida. Id. U.S. waters in the Gulf of Mexico were also specified and described 
in a map, and included within the geographic definition as “Specified Gulf 
Waters.” Id.   
126 Damage Category 1.3.1.2. pertains to economic damages. Id. at 967. It 
includes “[l]oss of income, earnings or profits suffered by Natural Persons or 
Entities as a result” of the spill. Id. Additional categories include commercial 
fishermen, vessels that were physically damaged, and real property (and 
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its certification order, the district court purportedly settled two 
issues regarding causation and individual damages.127  
On the causation issue, the district court wrote that only “some 
business claimants must demonstrate that the spill caused their 
losses.”128 The court further held that “[i]n many other cases 
causation is presumed.”129 Causation was presumed for claimants 
residing or working in the areas defined “Zone A.”130 Other 
claimants, including businesses located in Zones B and C, were 
required to prove causation.131 This could be shown with 
documents “typically required to calculate business economic 
loss,” or “documents that businesses either keep in the ordinary 
course or that may readily be prepared from a business’s books and 
records.”132  
                                                            
property sales) damage. Id. at 966–67. A full list of every damage category, and 
exceptions, is described in the district court’s opinion, under Section 1.3.1 of the 
class definition. Id. 
127 The court discusses these issues in its Rule 23(b)(3) analysis. See id. at 
924–28. 
128 Id. at 905 (emphasis added). 
129 Id. The district court relied on the parties’ Settlement Agreement to 
provide guidance as to which claimants would need to demonstrate causation 
and which would not. Id. at 906. BP and the BEL claimants began settlement 
negotiations in earnest in February 2011. Id. at 901. By August 13, 2012, the 
parties moved for final judicial approval of the agreement. Id. at 902. 
130 This includes specific geographic areas that are set out in detailed maps 
in Exhibits 1A–1C of the Settlement Agreement. Settlement Agreement at Ex. 
1A–C, In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 
20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012) (No. 12-970) [hereinafter District 
Court Settlement Agreement], available at http://www.deepwaterhorizon 
economicsettlement.com/docs/Amended_Settlement_Agreement_5.2.12_optimi
zed.pdf#search. It includes coastal areas in Southeast and Southwest Louisiana, 
and New Orleans, an area in Southeastern Texas, areas along southern 
Mississippi and Alabama, as well as areas in the Florida Panhandle, coastal 
areas from Tampa to Marco Island (along the Western coast of Florida), and the 
Florida Keys. Id. Exhibit 4B describes a list of claimants for “which there is no 
causation requirement.” Id. at Exh. 4B. This includes businesses located in Zone 
A, as well as businesses located in other geographical Zones that meet certain 
specified business definitional criteria. Id. 
131 Id.  
132 The Court, however, never specified what these documents might 
consist of. In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 905.  
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The court then addressed proof of individual damages.133 The 
court held that “issues of individual injury do not defeat 
predominance [Rule 23(b)(3)]” for the purposes of certifying the 
class for settlement.134 It acknowledged that, were the class action 
to proceed to litigation rather than settlement, “certain causation 
issues remain that would have to be decided on an individual 
basis.”135 Moreover, the court noted, it was sufficient that “core 
causation issues” could “be decided on a class-wide basis.”136 
These issues pertained primarily to BP’s liability.137 As for the 
claimants, the court found it would be “fairly capable” to attribute 
damages through the “various common methodologies” and 
“formulaic calculations” outlined in the Settlement Agreement.138  
 
2. Settlement Agreement Decision and Order by the 
District Court  
 
In October 2013, a panel of three Fifth Circuit judges 
addressed an earlier district court decision interpreting the parties’ 
Settlement Agreement.139 In a portion of that Fifth Circuit opinion, 
                                                            
133 Id. at 924–25 (finding that “issues of individual injury do not defeat 
predominance for purposes of evaluating this settlement class’s certification”).  
134 Id. at 924.  
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 924–25 (quoting Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 
598, 602 (5th Cir. 2006)) (“[L]imited individualized issues do not defeat 
predominance in light of the core common issues . . . the necessity of calculating 
damages on an individual basis will not necessarily preclude certification.”).  
137 The court wrote that “[a]ll of the key factual issues are common among 
members of the class.” Id. at 922. These issues included whether BP had a valid 
superseding cause defense, and whether BP unreasonably failed to take 
precautions to ensure that, in the event of a blowout, the oil would be contained 
in the immediate vicinity of the well. Id. 
138 Id. at 926. 
139 In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon I), 732 F.3d 326, 346 (5th 
Cir. 2013). According to BP, the Claims Administrator had erroneously 
interpreted Exhibit 4C of the Settlement Agreement by “not require[ing] the 
matching of revenues and expenses” in processing BEL claims. In re Deepwater 
Horizon (Deepwater Horizon III), 744 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2014).  
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Judge Clement expressed concern that, under the district court’s 
interpretation,140 damages may be awarded to “BEL claimants who 
admittedly either have suffered no loss at all or have suffered 
losses that were not caused by the oil spill.”141 She found that the 
district court lacked the authority to “approve the settlement of a 
class that included members that had not sustained losses at all, or 
had sustained losses unrelated to the oil spill.”142 Judge Southwick, 
in a concurring opinion, acknowledged that, while “logical,” the 
issues raised by Judge Clement could not be resolved because they 
had not been briefed or argued by the parties.143 By a 2-1 vote, the 
Fifth Circuit remanded for the district court to address whether 
certification was appropriate under the challenged interpretation.144 
On remand, the district court upheld certification under Rule 23 
although the accepted interpretation of the Agreement eschewed 
the need for groups of claimants to submit evidence that 
demonstrated causation.145  
 
 
 
                                                            
140 In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 822–23 
(5th Cir. 2014) (Garza, J., dissenting). Section 1.3.1.2 of the settlement 
agreement pertains to BEL claimants, and incorporates Exhibit 4B, which 
establishes causation requirements, by reference. Id. at 823. Together, the 
language of these provisions establishes a subset of claimants within the class 
where causation is presumed. Id. The Claims Administrator’s interpretation, 
which the district court agreed with, stated that he would compensate eligible 
BEL claimants “without regard to whether such losses resulted or may have 
resulted from a cause other than the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.” Id.  
141 Deepwater Horizon I, 732 F.3d at 340.  
142 Id. “A class settlement is not a private agreement between the parties. It 
is a creature of Rule 23, which authorizes its use to resolve the legal claims of a 
class ‘only with the court’s approval.” (citation omitted). Id. at 343.  
143 Id. at 346. 
144 Id. 
145 Order and Reasons [Responding to Remand of Business Economic Loss 
Issues], In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mex., on 
Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012) available at 
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/12242013Order(RevisedBELrema
nd).pdf.  
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B. The Fifth Circuit’s Decisions Affirming Certification & 
Causation 
 
The opinions described above resulted in two separate 
decisions by the Fifth Circuit on appeal. Taken together, these 
opinions highlight the less stringent of the two prevailing 
approaches applied by the federal circuits regarding the proof class 
members must provide in order to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3).  
 
1. The January 2014 Decision Affirming Certification 
(“Certification Decision”) 
 
In January 2014, the Fifth Circuit rejected BP’s challenge to 
the district court’s certification decision.146 The court first 
addressed Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement.147 BP argued 
that the class failed to meet this requirement because of the range 
of “class members’ economic injuries” and “the inclusion of 
members who ‘have suffered no injury at all’” in the certified 
class.148 The court disagreed. It held that certification did not 
violate Rule 23(a)(2) because a number of factual and legal issues 
were “central to the validity of all” class members’ claims.149 
According to the court, questions as to “[w]hether BP had a valid 
superseding cause defense,” or “[w]hether BP took appropriate and 
timely steps to stop the release of hydrocarbons from the well,” 
were central to all class members’ claims.150 
The court then addressed whether the district court erred in 
                                                            
146 In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 795 
(5th Cir. 2014). BP additionally challenged whether the claimants had standing 
under Article III, which the court rejected. Id. 
147 Id. at 809–810. As described above in Part I.B.1, Rule 23(a)(2) requires 
a showing that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
148 Deepwater Horizon II, 739 F.3d at 810 (citation omitted). 
149 Id. at 811. The Fifth Circuit found that in order to satisfy commonality 
under (a)(2), “class members must raise at least one contention that is central to 
the validity of each class member’s claims.” Id. at 810. Yet a central contention 
need not relate to damages. Rather, “an instance of injurious conduct, which 
would usually relate more directly to the defendant’s liability than to the 
claimant’s damages, could satisfy commonality. Id. 
150 Id. at 811. 
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finding that the class met Rule 23(b)(3). BP argued that 
predominance could not be satisfied when class members’ damage 
calculations gave “rise primarily to individual questions that are 
not capable of class-wide resolution.”151 The Fifth Circuit 
disagreed. Instead, it held that the diverse individualized damage 
calculations did not render Rule 23(b)(3) fatal.152 Rather, as it did 
earlier in its Rule 23(a)(2) analysis, the court emphasized the list of 
common issues identified by the district court that predominated 
over those affecting only individual members.153 “Nearly all of 
these issues” involved factual questions regarding BP’s connection 
to the “well design, explosion, discharge of oil, and cleanup 
efforts.”154 According to the court, individual questions pertaining 
to class members’ damages would not need to be addressed for 
purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).155 Had the case proceeded rather than 
settled, however, the district court would “have been obliged to 
determine” how BP’s liability would translate into compensation 
on an individual basis.156 But with the parties’ reaching an 
agreement, the court concluded, “by definition the litigation has 
been resolved and the questions have been answered.”157 
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit rejected BP’s argument that the class 
lacked predominance and affirmed certification of the class for 
settlement.158 
 
2. The March 2014 Settlement Agreement Causation 
Decision (“Causation Decision”)  
 
In December 2013, BP filed a separate appeal contesting the 
district court’s order upholding certification under the challenged 
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement.159 Under this 
                                                            
151 Id. at 815. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. (recalling the list of factual issues addressed below related to BP’s 
involvement in the spill).  
154 Id.  
155 Id. at 818. 
156 Id. at 816. 
157 Id. at 818. 
158 Id. at 818–19. 
159 In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon III), 744 F.3d 370, 374 
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interpretation, many claimants were not required to demonstrate 
evidence of causation tracing their damages to the spill.160 BP 
argued that this prevented the class from satisfying Rule 23(b)(3), 
as it produced individual damages questions that would 
predominate over any issues common to the class.161 BP alleged 
that millions had been paid to dubious claimants with either 
inflated claims or damages not traceable to the spill.162 One 
anomalous example includes $21 million paid to a Louisiana rice 
mill, situated forty miles from the coast, which earned more 
revenue the year of the spill than it did in each of the three years 
prior.163 BP also pointed to “a large cottage industry” of attorneys 
soliciting claimants who had “never believed they had suffered any 
losses to file claims ‘[i]f the numbers work.’”164  
The Fifth Circuit nevertheless affirmed the district court 
order.165 It held that BEL claimants were not required to prove 
their claims with trial-type evidence demonstrating that their 
injuries or economic losses were traceable to the oil spill.166 Judge 
Southwick’s opinion rested in part upon the fact that BP had not 
objected to the terms of the Settlement Agreement when it was 
pending approval before the district court.167 It also emphasized 
that the parties had agreed to the very form upon which BEL 
claimants would input their claims.168 According to the court, any 
                                                            
(5th Cir. 2014). 
160 See id. (summarizing the district court’s interpretation as “eschewing the 
need for evidence of causation”).  
161 Brief for Appellees BP Exploration & Prod. Inc., et al. at 43, In re 
Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon III), 744 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 
12-970) 2013 WL 8718641. 
162 Id. at 20.  
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 21. Members of the certified class included a wireless phone 
retailer that received over $135,000, despite losing its property to a fire prior to 
the spill, and a lawyer awarded over $172,000 although he lost his license to 
practice in 2009. Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Sympathy for the Devil, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/opinion/joe-nocera-sympathy-for-
the-devil.html.   
165 Deepwater Horizon III, 744 F.3d at 378. 
166 Id. at 376–77. 
167 Id. at 378. 
168 Id. at 376. 
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Rule 23(b)(3) issues posed by the interpretation and application of 
the Settlement Agreement had been “put to rest” by the January 
certification decision.169 
 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT  
 
Together, these decisions evidence one of two prevailing 
approaches taken by the federal circuits as to the level of proof 
required to meet Rule 23(b)(3). The Second and Third Circuits 
have followed an approach consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s BP 
decisions.170 In contrast, the D.C., Eighth, and Eleventh circuits 
have denied certification when a class contains claimants who 
cannot demonstrate injury caused by, or traceable to, the 
defendant’s conduct.171  
While a judicial solution rectifying the split is possible, it 
remains unlikely. Divergent applications will likely continue until 
the Supreme Court agrees to resolve these issues. On December 8, 
2014, however, it denied certiori to hear BP’s appeal of the Fifth 
Circuit decisions described above.172  
The next section will discuss the approach taken by the D.C. 
Circuit, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits (the “Individualized Proof” 
approach). The subsequent section will describe the standard that is 
                                                            
169 Id. 
170 See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 243–44 (2d Cir. 
2012); Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011).  
171 See In re Rail Freight Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 252 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Meeting the predominance requirement demands more than 
common evidence . . . . The plaintiffs must show that they can prove, through 
common evidence, that all class members were in fact injured.”); Halvorson v. 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In order for a class 
to be certified, each member must have standing and show an injury in fact that 
is traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed in a favorable decision.”); 
Bussey v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 F. App’x 782 (11th Cir. 
2014) (denying certification when plaintiffs’ damages model could not attribute 
losses to each defendant). 
172 Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Rejects BP’s Appeal of Oil Spill 
Settlement, NAT’L L. J. (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id= 
1202678363544/Supreme-Court-Rejects-BPs-Appeal-of-Oil-Spill-Settlement? 
slreturn=20150121002706.  
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applied by the Second and Third Circuits (the “Global Peace” 
approach), which is consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s BP 
decisions.173 This latter approach will then be examined in light of 
CAFA’s underlying policy aims and the Supreme Court’s 
precedent.  
 
A. Individualized Proof Approach  
 
The cases below illustrate the Individualized Proof approach, 
which has two distinct features. First, certification is found 
inappropriate when members of the class cannot sufficiently trace 
the injury alleged to the defendant’s conduct. Second, it demands 
that district courts conduct a careful evidentiary analysis of the 
plaintiffs’ claims to ensure that an adequate measure for proving 
damages exists. When the predominance inquiry turns on 
individualized damages determinations incapable of class-wide 
resolution, courts will deny certification.  
 
1. The D.C. Circuit: In re Rail Freight Surcharge 
Antitrust Litigation  
 
In In re Rail Freight Surcharge Antitrust Litigation (Rail),174 
the D.C. Circuit denied certification when individual injuries could 
not be shown under the putative class’s damages model.175 The 
class included a group of shippers alleging that four major freight 
railroads engaged in a price-fixing scheme in violation of federal 
antitrust law.176 The issue concerned “whether the plaintiffs could 
show, through common evidence, injury in fact to all class 
members from the alleged price-fixing scheme.”177  
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that deficiencies in the 
damages model rendered certification improper.178 According to 
                                                            
173 In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 815 
(5th Cir. 2013). 
174 In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.-MDL No. 1869, 725 
F.3d 244 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
175 Id. at 252. 
176 Id. at 247. 
177 Id. at 294. 
178 Id. at 255. The plaintiffs attempted to demonstrate injury through two 
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the court, where unreliable means of proving such injury exist, 
predominance cannot be met.179 Instead, “when a case turns on 
individualized proof of injury, [then] separate trials are in 
order.”180 The D.C. Circuit noted that “Rule 23 not only authorizes 
a hard look at the soundness of statistical [damages] models that 
purport to show predominance—the rule commands it.”181 
 
2. The Eighth Circuit: Halvorson v. Auto-Owners 
Insurance Company 
 
The D.C. Circuit’s application of the predominance 
requirement is consistent with that taken by the Eighth Circuit in 
Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company.182 There, the court 
held that Rule 23(b)(3) was not satisfied when individual fact 
inquiries were required to prove class members’ damages.183 
Halvorson concerned a breach of contract and bad faith claim 
arising from allegations that Auto-Owners employed an arbitrary 
cap on insurance payments under its PIP policy.184 The 
                                                            
regression models. Id. at 249–50. The first model attempted to “isolate the 
common determinants of the prices” that plaintiffs paid to the four defendant-
railroads. Id. at 250. The second model—the “damages model”—attempted to 
“quantify, in percentage terms, the overcharge due” to the defendant’s conduct. 
Id. Yet when the second model was applied to shippers bound by contracts 
negotiated prior to the alleged misconduct, it yielded similar results. Id. at 252. 
Accordingly, the same formula the district court relied on to satisfy Rule 
23(b)(3) “also detect[ed] injury where none could exist.” Id. 
179 Id. at 252–53. 
180 Id. at 253. 
181 Id. at 255. 
182 Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2013). 
183 Id. at 777. 
184 Id. at 774. Under the terms of the Policy, Auto-Owners represented that 
it would pay “reasonable charges incurred” for medical injuries sustained from 
car accidents. Id. at 775. In practice, the company compared claims against the 
80th percentile for services rendered in a defined geographic area. It would 
routinely approve payments up to the amount that “80 percent of doctors in the 
area” charge for services. Id. Payments for amounts that surpassed that 
percentile were rejected. Id. The plaintiffs contended that this practice resulted 
in the “nonpayment of reasonable medical expenses” and represented a breach 
of the insurance policy. Id. 
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Halvorsons, as lead plaintiffs, attempted to bring a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class action.185 They sought to certify a class consisting of all 
persons in North Dakota and Minnesota covered by the policy and 
who had received less than the full amount of a claim submitted.186 
The district court denied certification for Minnesota 
policyholders,187 but granted certification for those covered in 
North Dakota.188  
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that the individual 
inquiries pertaining to determining breach of contract and bad faith 
for each class member precluded certification.189 Members of the 
proposed class each sustained different injuries.190  They “were 
treated by different medical providers charging different prices for 
their services.”191 Yet under state law, the plaintiffs’ allegations 
require a determination of the “usual and customary” rate for each 
claim.192 In light of the differences among each member’s claim, 
the Eighth Circuit found that individual inquires would 
predominate over the proposed class.193 Resolving whether each 
payment was “usual and customary” would “overwhelm” any 
common questions of law or fact regarding the defendant’s 
policy.194  
 
 
                                                            
185 Id. at 774–76. 
186 Id. at 775. 
187 Id. at 776. Minnesota state law required arbitration to resolve all no-
fault claims for under $10,000. Id. The district court found the “arbitration 
requirement shatters” the requirements of Rule 23(a), as the Minnesota 
claimants would “comprise a subclass that ‘would have radically different 
interests’” from the North Dakota class members. Id. (citation omitted). 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 779–80. 
190 Id. 
191 Id.   
192 Id. (“To determine whether there was a breach of contract under North 
Dakota law will require an analysis of what are ‘usual and customary’ rates.”). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 779 (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 
(2013)).  
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3. The Eleventh Circuit: Bussey v. Macon County 
Greyhound Park 
 
In Bussey v. Macon County Greyhound Park,195 the Eleventh 
Circuit held that certification was improper when the plaintiffs’ 
damages model did not provide an accurate method for 
calculating—and attributing—the alleged loss to each defendant.196 
The plaintiffs brought state statutory law197 claims against 
Victoryland, an Alabama gambling establishment, and the 
manufacturers of three electronic bingo machines that were in use 
at the casino.198 In their claims against the manufacturers, the 
plaintiffs had to prove not only that they lost money on the 
machines, but the amount of each member’s losses.199 The district 
court certified the class despite acknowledging the individualized 
nature of these inquires.200 It found that any “shortcomings” 
pertaining to damages were “issues for sifting at the merits stage, 
not the class certification stage.”201 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this notion on appeal.202 By 
deferring questions of damages to a later stage in litigation, the 
district court failed to address the plaintiffs’ inability to proffer a 
method of quantifying the losses attributable to each manufacturer 
named as a defendant.203 The Eleventh Circuit relied on Comcast, 
which reiterated the necessity for courts to conduct a careful 
                                                            
195 Bussey v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 F. App’x 782 (11th 
Cir. 2014). 
196 Id. at 790–91. 
197 Id. at 784; see ALA. CODE § 8–1–150(A) (2014). The statute at issue 
renders void “all contracts founded in whole or in part on a gambling 
consideration.” ALA. CODE § 8–1–150(A). It further allows persons who have 
lost money while using a gambling machine to recover that sum by filing an 
action within six months of payment. Bussey, 562 F. App’x at 784; see ALA. 
CODE § 8–1–150(A). 
198 Bussey, 562 F. App’x at 784. 
199 Williams v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-191, 2013 
WL 1337154, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2013). 
200 Id.  
201 Id. 
202 Bussey, 562 F. App’x at 790. The Eleventh Circuit appeal concerned the 
three machine manufacturers, not Victoryland or its officers. Id. at 784. 
203 Id. at 790. 
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analysis of the pleadings at the certification stage.204 This analysis 
inquires into any individual damages issues up front, then seeks to 
resolve them before an affirmative grant of certification. Finding 
that the district court had not conducted this “rigorous analysis,” 
the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case.205 Without proof that 
damages were calculable on a class-wide basis, questions affecting 
individual members predominated over common questions with 
respect to the manufacturers’ liability.206  
 
B. The Global Peace Approach  
 
Three circuits engage in the Global Peace approach, which 
bypasses the rigorous predominance inquiry described above.207 
Instead, these circuits grant certification of classes despite 
uncertainty over the ability of various members to assert viable 
claims.208 Both of the Fifth Circuit BP decisions, as well as recent 
                                                            
204 Id. (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013)).  
205 Id. at 791. In doing so, it instructed the lower court to allow additional 
discovery on the issue of damages. Id. at 791 n.8. 
206 Id. at 790–91 (quoting Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1433). 
207 This term is used to highlight the notion that class action settlements, 
while not all “global” in the literal sense, provide a sense of peace to three 
distinct parties—class members, defendants, and courts—by serving as “private 
administrative systems” that “shift claims from the ordinary tort system to a 
private regime that promises more efficient compensation for plaintiffs, long-
term peace for defendants, and a reduced litigation burden for the courts.” 
Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class 
Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 751 (2002).  
208 See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 242–43 (2d Cir. 
2012) (holding that lead plaintiffs not required to prove fraud-on-the-market 
presumption to satisfy predominance requirement); Sullivan v. DB Invs. Inc., 
667 F.3d 273, 304 (3d Cir. 2011) (certifying the class although individual 
members were unable to bring a valid claim under applicable state law); In re 
Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon III), 744 F.3d 370, 376–77 (5th Cir. 
2014) (holding that claimants were not required to prove their claims using trial-
type evidence that show their injuries were traceable to the spill); see also 
Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A 
Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 308 (2014) (citing these same cases as 
examples of the less stringent application of Rule 23(b)(3) certification 
procedures).   
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cases by the Second and Third Circuits, are illustrative of this 
approach.  
Although each of these cases has arisen in classes involving 
settlement rather than trial, Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements are no 
different.209 The Global Peace approach is an alternative to the 
Individualized Proof inquiry. Under the approach, predominance 
can be met despite various class plaintiffs’ questionable ability to 
prove that damages are traceable to the defendant’s conduct.  
 
1. The Second Circuit: In re American International Group, 
Inc. Securities Litigation 
 
In re American International Group, Inc. Securities Litigation 
(AIG) involved several securities fraud class actions filed against 
AIG and other defendants in October 2004.210 In 2006, the lead 
plaintiffs sought to certify a class defined as all “investors who 
purchased AIG’s publicly traded securities between October 28, 
1999, and April 1, 2005.”211 Thereafter, Gen Re, a named 
defendant, moved for judgment on the pleadings. It argued that, 
because the plaintiffs had “not established or even pled that the 
Gen Re Defendants made any public misstatement or omission 
with regard to AIG,” the traditional presumption of reliance could 
not apply.212 The district court denied certification, holding that 
individual issues of reliance would predominate over common 
issues regarding claims against Gen Re.213 After the district court 
rejected a settlement agreement between the Gen Re and the class 
for the same reason, the parties appealed to the Second Circuit to 
                                                            
209 See Klonoff, supra note 68, at 804 (observing the Supreme Court has 
“held that predominance must be satisfied even for settlement classes”); see also 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) (explaining that 
Rule 23(b)(3) demands “undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement 
context”).  
210 In re Am. Int’l Grp., 689 F.3d at 232–33. The complaint alleged 
violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 233. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. (quoting In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 175 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
213 Id. (quoting In re Am. Int’l Grp., 265 F.R.D. at 175). 
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resolve the issue of certifying the settlement class.214 
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the class’ inability to 
satisfy the fraud-on-the-market presumption did not defeat a 
finding of predominance.215 According to the court, the existence 
of a settlement agreement “alter[ed] the outcome of the 
predominance analysis.”216 It acknowledged that, in a litigation 
class, deferring plaintiffs’ proof of fraud-on-the-market until after 
certification would be inappropriate.217 This is because, under 
Supreme Court precedent, a defendant’s successful rebuttal of the 
presumption defeats the predominance requirement along with any 
viable 10(b) claims.218 According to the Second Circuit, however, 
“with a settlement class, the manageability concerns posed by 
numerous individual questions of reliance disappear.”219 
Effectively, then, defendants may settle class suits “even if a court 
believes that those claims may be meritless, provided that the class 
is properly certified under Rules 23(a) and (b).”220  
 
2. The Third Circuit: Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc. 
 
In Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc.,221 the Third Circuit 
certified a nationwide class under 23(b)(3) although numerous 
members were unable to bring a valid claim under applicable state 
law.222 The case concerned a nationwide class action suit against 
De Beers, alleging antitrust and consumer protection violations of 
both state and federal law.223 There were two nationwide 
                                                            
214 Id. at 237. The parties contended that, although “certification of a 
litigation class” was deemed inappropriate, the court “could—and should—
nonetheless certify a settlement class.” Id. at 236–37. 
215 Id. at 242–43. 
216 Id. at 242. 
217 Id.  
218 Id. (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 n.29 (1988)). 
219 Id. at 241. 
220 Id. at 243–44. 
221 Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011). 
222 Id. at 304–05.  
223 Id. at 285–86. The complaint alleged that De Beers orchestrated a global 
sales network with competitor diamond producers. Id. at 286. De Beers was 
charged with “executing output-purchase agreements with competitors, 
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settlement classes: direct and indirect diamond purchasers.224 
However, only the indirect class sought damages under state, 
rather than federal, law.225  
At issue before the Third Circuit was the propriety of certifying 
the nationwide indirect purchaser class under Rule 23(b)(3) when 
various members possessed no legal claim under state law.226 The 
court found that the variations in the substantive state law 
underlying individual claims did not overwhelm the common legal 
and factual issues regarding De Beers’ liability.227 According to 
Judge Rendell, the settlement posture228 of the case effectively 
“marginalize[d]” any concern “that state law variations undermine 
a finding of predominance.”229 The court concluded that settlement 
eliminated the “principal burden of establishing the elements of 
liability under disparate laws.”230 It was instead sufficient that each 
member of the Rule 23(b)(3) class shared “a similar legal question 
arising from whether De Beers engaged in a broad conspiracy that 
was aimed to and did affect” U.S. diamond prices.231  
Underlying the court’s application of the predominance 
                                                            
setting/synchronizing production limits, restricting the resale of diamonds in 
certain geographic regions, and directing marketing and advertising.” Id. 
224 Id. at 287. 
225 Id. 
226 See id. at 285. For example, some states allowed indirect purchasers to 
recover for an antitrust violation. Id. at 348 (Jordan, J., dissenting). Still, others 
have “declared unequivocally” that indirect purchasers lack standing to bring 
such a claim. Id. Even more, a number of other states have observed that indirect 
purchasers lack standing to bring “what is effectively an antitrust claim.” Id. In 
short, in at least some of the states, putative members are fully foreclosed “from 
bringing an antitrust claim, no matter how they dress it up.” Id. 
227 Id. at 297 (majority opinion). 
228 De Beers and the indirect purchaser class reached a settlement 
agreement prior to the grant of certification. Id. at 287–88. This agreement had 
two stipulations. First, De Beers would establish a $250 million settlement fund, 
which would be distributed among members of the indirect purchaser class. Id. 
at 288. Second, it agreed not to contest certification of the class. Id. 
229 Id. at 302–03. 
230 Id. at 303. The court relied on its own precedent in reaching its 
conclusion. In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 
148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that variations in state law do not 
defeat predominance). 
231 Sullivan, at 343 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
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requirement is a policy preference for “global peace.”232 Under this 
notion, a rigorous predominance application, which requires that 
class members allege a “colorable claim,” prevents defendants 
from effectively buying peace through settlement.233 The majority 
determined that by entering into a comprehensive settlement, De 
Beers sought to avoid prolonged litigation and re-litigation of 
“settled questions” across state and federal courts.234 This, 
according to the court, weighed in favor of overlooking otherwise 
fatal infirmities among numerous members’ claims.235  
 
3. The Fifth Circuit: In re Deepwater Horizon Decisions 
 
The In re Deepwater Horizon decisions discussed above are 
the most recent application of the Global Peace approach. Both the 
certification decision and the decision interpreting the Settlement 
Agreement found predominance satisfied although the class 
contained members unable to prove their alleged damages had 
been caused by the spill.236  In its January decision, the Fifth 
Circuit acknowledged that damages calculations raised “individual 
questions that are not capable of class wide resolution.”237 
However, the variance among members’ ability to prove damages 
                                                            
232 Id. at 310–11 (majority opinion). Some scholars refer to the “global 
peace” notion espoused by the court as a “peace premium.” See generally D. 
Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. 
L. REV. 1183, 1207 (2013). This concept reflects the notion that defendants may 
be willing to pay a mark-up to settle a class action in order to resolve all similar 
claims, meritorious or not, so as to foreclose piecemeal litigation or settlement 
of individualized issues. Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil 
Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 416 
(2014). 
233 Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 310. 
234 Id.  
235 Id. at 310–12. 
236 See In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 
818–19 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that the class satisfied the predominance 
requirement despite some members being unable to trace alleged losses to the 
spill); In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon III), 744 F.3d 370, 373 (5th 
Cir. 2014) (holding that BEL claimants were not required to use trial type 
evidence to prove losses were caused by the spill). 
237 Deepwater Horizon II, 739 F.3d at 815. 
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was not sufficient to defeat predominance. According to the court, 
“the existence of a settlement agreement allows the district court to 
dispense altogether” with resolving issues of individualized 
damages.238  Like in Sullivan, once common questions regarding 
liability were established, the need to resolve individualized 
inquiries pertaining to the class effectively disappeared.239  
The March decision, upholding certification of the Rule 
23(b)(3) class, held claimants need not submit evidence that their 
alleged injury arose as a result of the spill.240 It was sufficient that 
each member attest, “under penalty of perjury, that [their] claim in 
fact was due” to the oil spill.241 As with Second and Third Circuits, 
the Fifth Circuit found settlement to be a mitigating factor in 
resolving whether individual issues across the class may defeat 
certification.242 Predominance was met despite the modest degree 
of proof required of claimants regarding causation.243 As the 
Majority opinion observed, this merely represented “a contractual 
concession” by the defendant, not a fatal defect in the 
predominance inquiry.244  
 
C. The Global Peace Approach in Light of Supreme Court 
Precedent 
 
The Global Peace approach directly conflicts with the Supreme 
Court’s Rule 23(b)(3) jurisprudence. Both the AIG and Sullivan 
courts found that questionable claims among the class did not 
defeat predominance. This, they reasoned, was because the case 
management problems that such individualized issues present are 
mitigated by the lack of a trial.245 In the January decision affirming 
                                                            
238 Id. at 818. 
239 See Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 335 (Scirica, J., concurring) (finding same 
operative fact of liability sufficient when various members could not plead claim 
under state law).  
240 Deepwater Horizon III, 744 F.3d at 372. 
241 Id. at 376–77. 
242 Id. at 378. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. at 377. 
245 See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 302–03 (3d Cir. 2011); In 
re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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certification, the Fifth Circuit also relied upon what it saw to be an 
ameliorating effect of settlement upon questionable claims.246 
Although the court recognized that potential infirmities across 
claims did exist, settlement rendered these issues “resolved and . . . 
answered.”247 
Like these circuits, the Supreme Court has also recognized that 
settlement is germane to class certification.248 But it has stressed 
the need for more vigilance in applying Rule 23(b)(3) when 
“individual stakes are high and disparities among class members 
great.”249 The predominance analysis therefore “demand[s] 
undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context.”250 
According to the Court, this serves to protect the interests of 
absentee members who would be disadvantaged by overbroad or 
unwarranted definitions of the class.251  
In light of these concerns, recent Supreme Court decisions have 
urged for courts to undertake a “rigorous” analysis at the 
certification stage.252 This seeks to ensure that damages alleged by 
class members bear a causal connection to the defendant’s 
conduct.253 While damage calculations “need not be exact,” they 
must be “attributable” to the legal theory establishing the 
defendant’s liability.254 Yet in each of the cases following the 
Global Peace approach, the Court found predominance met despite 
facial infirmities in this regard. In AIG, the Rule 23(b)(3) plaintiffs 
were incapable of alleging the rebuttable presumption of fraud-on-
the-market against the Gen Re defendant.255 Likewise, in Sullivan, 
                                                            
246 In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 818 
(5th Cir. 2014). 
247 Id. 
248 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) 
(“Settlement is relevant to a class certification.”).  
249 Id. at 625.  
250 Id. at 620. 
251 Id. 
252 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (quoting Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551–52 (2011)).  
253 Id.  
254 Id. 
255 In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 242–43 (2d Cir. 
2012).  
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various members of the nationwide class could not legally bring a 
claim against the defendant under relevant state law.256 Still, in 
each case, predominance was satisfied.  
The inconsistency between the Global Peace approach and the 
Supreme Court’s Rule 23(b)(3) precedent has only deepened the 
split between the circuits. The circuits that follow the 
Individualized Proof approach have relied heavily on cases such as 
Wal-Mart and Comcast. Yet, as described above, the Second, 
Third, and Fifth Circuits have avoided the more rigorous review 
demanded by the very same opinions. The result: a landscape of 
class certification jurisprudence that shares many of the policy 
concerns that precipitated CAFA’s enactment.  
 
D. Return to Pre-CAFA Concerns: The Implications of a 
Circuit Split 
 
Each party involved in the class action loses when circuits 
apply divergent standards of proof at certification. As Professor 
Ricahrd Nagareda observed, “a jurisprudence of class actions that 
includes precedents for both underreach and overreach in the 
certification inquiry unwittingly adds to the potential for judicial 
slight of hand in either direction.”257  
Business defendants have been particularly outspoken 
regarding the potential impact that the present split can have on 
their interests.258 In an amicus brief to the Supreme Court, the U.S. 
                                                            
256 Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 348 (3d Cir. 2011). These 
findings are also difficult to reconcile with Wal-Mart. There the Court instructed 
that the party seeking certification “must affirmatively demonstrate” compliance 
with requirements of Rule 23. Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 
(2011). In each of the relevant cases, however, the circuits allowed certification 
despite numerous members lacking the ability to plead a legally cognizable 
claim. 
257 Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 170 (2009).  
258 Both the United States Chamber of Commerce and the Government of 
the United Kingdom filed amicus briefs to the Supreme Court on behalf of BP, 
seeking to have the Court resolve the uncertainty between the circuits. See 
Motion for Leave To File Amicus Brief and Brief for Amici Curiae the Chamber 
of Commerce of the U.S. of Am., et al. in Support of Petitioners, BP Exploration 
& Prod. Inc. v. Lake Eugenie Land & Dev., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014) (No. 14-
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Chamber of Commerce expressed concern that the Fifth Circuit’s 
decisions, if permitted to stand, may “impose, enormous, 
unsubstantiated liability” on businesses named as class action 
defendants.259 This liability, it argued, would “then affect 
consumers, in the form of higher prices.”260 According to the 
Chamber of Commerce, this was a danger “particularly acute in the 
class action context,” where class counsel “are apt to choose a 
forum that would permit an increase in the breadth of any eventual 
settlement.”261 “After all,” it was sure to point out, “larger 
settlement results in larger [attorneys’] fees.”262  
These concerns should sound familiar. Business defendants and 
“their fellow-traveler amici” have been “perfectly capable of 
ratcheting up catastrophic bombast to” portray perceptions of class 
actions litigation’s “in terrorem effect” on corporations.263 This 
was true prior to CAFA, and it appears to be the case today.264 Yet 
one need not surrender to this rationale to find merit in resolving 
the present circuit split. The certification decision is increasingly 
recognized as the pivotal moment in class action litigation.265 
Denial of certification can leave legitimately harmed parties 
without representation or a means for redress.266 Affirmative grants 
may, despite all the hyperbolic arguments, spell immense trouble 
for businesses that are named as defendants.267 Moreover, “there 
are not a lot of do-overs in the class certification realm.”268 Most 
                                                            
123), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2014/09/bp-
chambercertamicus.pdf [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Brief]; Brief of Her 
Britannic Majesty’s Gov’t of the U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners, BP Exploration & Prod. Inc. v. Lake Eugenie Land & 
Dev., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014) (No. 14-123), available at 
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2014/09/bp-ukcertamicus.pdf. 
259 Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 258, at 11. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
263 Linda S. Mullenix, Putting Proponents to Their Proof: Evidentiary 
Rules at Class Certification, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 606, 630 (2014).  
264 See supra Part I.C.1. 
265 See Bone & Evans, supra note 5, at 1262–63.  
266 Mullenix, supra note 263, at 630. 
267 Id.  
268 Id. at 631. 
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cases settle before trial but after certification, thereby making 
certification “the district judge’s last word . . . [or] test of the 
decision’s factual premises.”269 In order to provide the greatest 
protections for class-members, defendants, and the viability of the 
class action vehicle as a whole, a coherent legislative response is 
required.270   
 
IV. PUTTING THE “F” BACK IN CAFA: TOWARD A LEGISLATIVE 
SOLUTION 
 
A. Preliminary Considerations  
 
The proposal must provide evidentiary governance 
mechanisms that require a baseline level of proof from the class 
members at the certification stage. At the same time, the 
procedural framework must take into account the practical 
difficulties and concerns pertaining to the availability of such 
information, and the ultimate issue of how much proof will be 
sufficient. Any proposed amendment to class action certification 
                                                            
269 Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001); 
see Mullenix, supra note 263, at 631. 
270 These issues are important, especially in light of the substantial 
economic costs small claims class actions under 23(b)(3) can impose. Recently, 
Toyota settled a class action litigation related to unintended acceleration in some 
of its vehicles, with the class including economic loss members. Jonathan 
Sourbeer, Op. Ed., A Close Reading of My $20.91 Settlement Check, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 24, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/jonathan-sourbeer-a-close-
reading-of-my-20-91-settlement-check-1416780793. The court awarded the 
class attorneys over $27 million in fees and costs, with the 25 primary plaintiffs 
and class representatives receiving $395,270 in total and non-representative 
members, those who never even opted in to the class or actively pursued the 
litigation, receiving checks for as low as a dime under $21. Id. As Mr. Sourbeer 
writes:  
If all the time, loss and suffering of the 25 plaintiffs and 
representatives of the lawsuit are only worth some $400,000, 
what law of efficient economics justifies $27 million in legal 
expenses for such a paltry return? None, unless the real return 
goes almost entirely to the law firms––in this case the more 
than $200 million that will be recouped from future car buyers 
and others.   
Id. 
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procedures must be responsive to the legitimate aims that the class 
action vehicle serves. These values include providing dignity, 
vindication, and individualized civil justice, to groups of 
legitimately harmed plaintiffs.271 In that respect, it must strike a 
fine balance between providing for procedures that enable courts to 
filter illegitimate claims, while not discouraging meritorious ones. 
In short, it must provide a framework that preserves “the tripartite 
values of justice, economy, and efficiency . . . without descending 
into sloppiness or cynicism.”272   
 
B. Guidance From the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (PSLRA) of 1995  
 
Securities litigation is one subcategory within the larger class 
action context. Yet the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA) of 1995273 provides an apt example, and subsequently, an 
assessment, of an attempt to solve perceived misuse of the class 
action vehicle through procedural legislation.  
Like CAFA, the PSLRA made its way through Congress274 
motivated by an attempt to bring “sanity and evenhandedness to 
the [securities fraud] class-action schema[,]” which was perceived 
                                                            
271 As will be discussed in the proposal, this requires an exception for 
certain cases where the social value of bringing the claim outweighs the cost of 
allowing the class to be certified when a heightened Rule 23(b)(3) analysis 
would otherwise lead to denial of certification. See Katie Melnick, In Defense of 
the Class Action Lawsuit: An Examination of the Implicit Advantages and a 
Response To Common Criticisms, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 755, 788–
93 (2008) (offering a strong argument regarding the many social benefits that 
class actions have traditionally been recognized to foster, including deterrence, 
social justice, and access to the courts).  
272 Cabraser, supra note 22, at 518. 
273 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
274 In fact, the PSLRA passed Congress over presidential veto.  The reason 
for then-President Clinton’s veto was the belief that the heightened pleading 
requirements would impose “an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious 
claims being heard in Federal courts.” See Kathryn B. McKenna, Pleading 
Securities Fraud Using Confidential Sources under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: It’s All in the Details, 55 RUTGERS L. REV 205, 
210 (2002) (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. S19035 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995)). 
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at least by the act’s proponents, to be pungent with abuses.275 To 
deal with these issues, the PSLRA introduced a heightened 
pleading standard for securities class actions and other procedural 
mechanisms,276 which sought to ferret out non-meritorious 
claims.277  
Under the PSLRA, plaintiffs are required to “state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind” to mislead 
investors.278 According to Professor Michael A. Perino, the 
                                                            
275 andré douglas pond cummings, “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How the 
1994 Republican Revolution and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
Contributed To the Collapse of the United States Capital Markets, 83 NEB. L. 
REV. 979, 1005–06 (2005). See also Swack v. Credit Suisse First Bos., 230 
F.R.D. 250, 258 (D. Mass. 2005) (considering, as one of the policies underlying 
enactment of PLSRA, “Congress’ response to perceived abuses in securities 
fraud litigation”); In re Accelr8 Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 
1053–54 (D. Colo. 2001) (“The purpose of the PSLRA is to prevent an 
onslaught of expensive and frivolous lawsuits when stock prices plummet, 
which could force corporations to settle meritless claims to avoid the expense of 
discovery and trial.”). 
276 Another major component of this legislation was the addition of Section 
21D to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & 
JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 875 
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 10th ed. 2011). This introduced procedures that 
enabled courts to appoint lead plaintiffs to monitor the class action litigation and 
reduce potential agency costs that may result due to divergent interests between 
class counsel and the class of shareholder plaintiffs. Id.  
277 Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 924 (2003) (describing that heightened 
pleading was considered to function as “an appropriate solution to 
nonmeritorious class actions”); see also EISENBERG & COX, supra note 276, at 
875 (“What prompted Congress to act was the burgeoning number of securities 
class actions that Congress believed were largely nuisance suits initiated to 
extract settlements that benefitted only the class action lawyers, produced small 
rewards to investors alleged harmed by the fraud, and rendered the U.S. capital 
markets anticompetitive versus rival foreign markets.”). 
278 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012). Specifically, for a security holder to allege 
a fraudulent omission or misleading statement, the complaint must “specify each 
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the 
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or 
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with 
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.” Id. 
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Securities and Exchange Commission favored a procedural device 
to curb frivolous claims, rather than substantive changes that may 
unsettle existing securities law.279 As both scholars280 and industry 
practitioners281 have noted, however, Congress’ failure to 
adequately define the term “strong inference,” the PSLRA’s 
scienter requirement, or “set forth a rubric for courts to use to 
determine whether a plaintiff pled facts sufficient” to allege such a 
motive in the statute, yields a situation similar to Rule 23(b)(3) 
class certification jurisprudence.282  
Circuits have promulgated wide-ranging approaches to 
defining key terms under the PSLRA.283 As a result, courthouses 
                                                            
279 Perino, supra note 277, at 924 n.63 (citing then-SEC Chairman Arthur 
Levitt’s response to written questions of Senator Domencini of New Mexico, 
during 1994 Senate hearings prior to enactment of the law, where the former 
Chairman stated that ‘meritless litigation should be addressed through carefully 
crafted procedural and pleading requirements,’ rather than by changing the 
‘fundamental scope’ of substantive securities law). 
280 Id. at 926 (“Courts have split sharply over precisely what the ‘strong 
inference’ portion of the standard requires.”); see James D. Cox, et al., Do 
Differences in Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shopping in Securities Class 
Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 421, 421 (2009) 
(“Federal appellate courts have promulgated divergent legal standards for 
pleading fraud in securities fraud class actions after the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act.”). 
281 Sharon Nelles and Hillary Huber represent financial institutions and 
global companies in civil lawsuits, regulatory and criminal investigations, and 
enforcement actions at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. Their recent article, Pleading 
Securities Fraud Claims: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, observes that one 
fallout from the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirement has been the 
difficulty federal courts have experienced agreeing upon a uniform 
interpretation of the provision’s key terms. Sharon Nelles & Hilary Huber, 
Pleading Securities Fraud Claims: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 45 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 653, 656 (2014) (describing that ambiguity as a result of Congress’s 
failure to further define ‘strong inference’ under the PLSRA has led to “a circuit 
split, with courts across the country applying different standards”). 
282 Id.  
283 John M. Wunderlich, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The 
Weighing Game, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 623 (2008) (“Without legislative 
guidance on how to apply the scienter requirement, the federal courts embarked 
on the long road of discerning the congressional intent behind the nebulous 
language of ‘strong inference.’ The circuits invariably took different paths.”). 
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diverge regarding the pleading sufficient to satisfy the scienter 
requirement under the statute.284 Importantly, however, this split 
has not led to forum shopping.285 A 2011 study by James Cox, 
Randall Thomas, and Lynn Bai analyzed over 10 years of post-
PSLRA litigation data and estimated that “almost 85 percent of 
cases being brought [were filed] in the circuit of the defendant 
firm’s principal place of business,” rather than the circuit with the 
most (relatively) favorable interpretation of “strong inference.”286 
At the same time, the authors of the study note that the divergent 
circuit applications raise significant concerns, including the 
potential undermining of substantive law.287  
The PSLRA can guide the proposed CAFA amendment in at 
least two respects. First, a pleading standard seeking to resolve 
divergent judicial applications will never result in total uniformity 
in courts across the country. Judges will, and should, exercise 
discretion when applying the standard to the unique factual 
characteristics of the class and case presented.288 The circuits 
                                                            
284 Id. at 624 (describing the “gamut of possibilities” that different circuits 
have used in making this determination). 
285 Cox, et al., supra note 280, at 451 (finding that “data supports the 
conclusion that differences across pleading requirements do not support 
significant forum shopping”).  
286 Id.  
287 Id. at 452. In addition to undermining substantive law, the professors 
argue that forum shopping contributes to the following: the potential for 
overburdening of the jurisdiction(s) with the most plaintiff-friendly approach, 
removing the site of the litigation far from the source of the conflict so as to 
increase the parties’ expenses, and more generally, perpetuating “a negative 
perception of the fairness of the legal system.” Id. Although the authors believe 
that a clear and consistent interpretation can rectify the split, it is important to 
note that Cox, Thomas, and Bai describe the need for a judicial determination 
from the Supreme Court: “for example, identifying which of the three disparate 
approaches [among circuits] it believed was consistent with the intent of 
Congress.” Id. at 453. 
288 See generally Wolff, supra note 85 (arguing that courts inherently have, 
and will continue to, possess some discretion over class certification decisions, 
which may promote positive values). Professors James A. Grundfest and A.C. 
Pritchard argue that a level of ambiguity in the drafting of statutes might be 
optimal. James A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple 
Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and 
Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002).  As they explain:  
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grappled with interpreting the PSLRA’s “strong inference” 
language following its enactment.289 It may be inevitable that a 
“particularity” standard in the proposed amendment to CAFA 
would lead to similar interpretive issues.  
The PSLRA provides an example of how vague drafting and 
unclear legislative history can create divergent court approaches.290 
The split regarding the proper interpretation of PSLRA’s “strong 
inference” was, at least in part, a result of ambiguity regarding 
which circuit approach Congress had intended to adopt.291 In order 
to achieve uniformity, any new amendment must—unlike the 
PSLRA—be articulately drafted and accompanied by a clear 
legislative history.  In amending CAFA, Congress must be 
unequivocal in adopting the approach of the Individualized Proof 
circuits. Still, it should not expect to create an automated 
procedural framework that eliminates room for interpretation.292 
Instead, this Note urges for the implementation of a standard in an 
area of the law where courts presently lack any clear statutory, 
procedural guidance whatsoever.  
 
                                                            
[A]n unresolvable measure of ambiguity may be part of the 
essential fabric of our legal regime. Efforts to impose greater 
precision than the underlying political structure can bear may 
lead nowhere because the political equilibrium between the 
judicial and legislative branches may benefit from a base level 
of interpretive ambiguity. 
Id. at 636.   
289 See Nelles & Huber, supra note 281, at 656–58. It is important to note, 
however, that the PSLRA included both “particularity” and “strong inference,” 
and much of the disagreement among courts has been over interpreting the 
latter. Id. 
290 An incoherent legislative history and confusing drafting was a major 
criticism of the statute. Illustrating the opinion of at least one court, Judge 
Gilbert Stroud Merritt Jr. of the Sixth Circuit described the PSLRA as a “statute 
containing general language . . . of abstraction, [and] an ambiguous legislative 
history.” Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2001).  
291 Specifically, it was unclear whether the statute sought to incorporate the 
Second Circuit’s “motive and opportunity” test, or an even more rigorous 
standard with this language. Cox, et al., supra note 280, at 431. 
292 For a developed analysis of how courts will inevitably interpret statutes 
and procedural determinations slightly differently, and why this may be 
beneficial, see Mark Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645 (2011). 
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V. SHAPING THE AMENDMENT 
 
The following sections urge Congress to adopt a modified 
Individualized Proof approach. To begin, the practical and policy-
driven concerns presented by the competing approaches will be 
assessed. The remaining sections set forth the components of the 
proposed approach, which includes three main features: a 
particularity pleading standard; a provision exempting certain 
cases from this heightened pleading when obtaining the requisite 
proof is highly impracticable; and finally, increased evidentiary 
oversight in cases implementing this exemption. By enacting this 
amendment, Congress can add a degree of clarity to Rule 23(b)(3) 
certification, the most pivotal stage in class action litigation. 
 
A. Choosing a Standard Between Competing Approaches 
 
1. The Arguments For and Against The Individualized 
Proof Approach 
 
The Individualized Proof approach recognizes that discrete 
issues of proof, particularly damages, are often common among 
members of a class.293 It therefore calls for more vigilance at the 
certification stage to prevent circumvention of Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance requirement. Each of the three circuits applying this 
approach emphasized a careful evidentiary analysis of the 
pleadings to ensure that proffered damages models represent 
injuries that are in fact traceable to the defendant’s conduct.294 At 
the same time, one obvious infirmity of this approach is that most, 
if not all, classes are incapable of providing “perfectly uniform 
damages.”295  
There are practical difficulties in pleading a class-wide injury 
in-fact. This is felt acutely in employment discrimination class 
actions, where showing class-wide discriminatory treatment can 
present significant hurdles to certification.296 An accepted benefit 
                                                            
293 Parkinson, supra note 49, at 1228.  
294 See supra Part III.A. 
295 Parkinson, supra note 49, at 1229. 
296 See Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, supra note 81, 
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of the class action vehicle is that it allows the class to enforce legal 
rights that, as individuals, members may not pursue.297 Critics of 
heightened certification argue that a more rigorous Rule 23 review 
deters such claims, and thereby denies access to justice.298 These 
are legitimate concerns, which the proposed amendment seeks to 
address. Still, proponents of a heightened pleading standard have 
countered the “access to justice” argument with a fairness claim of 
their own. At least in certain contexts, some believe it is 
“fundamentally unfair to force a defendant to spend millions or 
tens of millions” to defend claims rooted in “a few short 
paragraphs of a complaint,” rather than factual proof.299 Complex 
litigation is costly and enhanced pleading standards can address the 
issue.300  
Another critique of a full-faith application of the Individualized 
Proof approach would be “the perverse incentive for bad actors” to 
cause more injury to more persons.301 As Alex Parkinson imagines, 
“[b]y increasing the size of the class, the wrongdoer increases its 
                                                            
at 620 (describing the difficulties proving class-wide injury in Title VII 
employment discrimination class-actions).  
297 See Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications 
of Dukes v.. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 34, 36–37 (2011) (offering a 
summary of the enforcement benefits class actions provide, and writing that, 
without the vehicle, “those with small claims and limited resources are unlikely 
to challenge powerful corporations on their own, effectively immunizing 
companies from complying with the law”). 
298 See Francisco Valdes, Procedure, Policy and Power: Class Actions and 
Social Justice in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
627, 654 (2008) (describing how increased scrutiny over race-based class actions 
has amounted to a denial of access to justice); Suzette M. Malveaux, The Power 
and Promise of Procedure: Examining the Class Action Landscape after Wal-
Mart v. Dukes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 659, 661 (2013) (claiming that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wal-Mart compromises employee-plaintiffs’ “access to 
justice”).  
299 This argument has been used in class actions pertaining to antitrust 
claims. Edward Cavanagh, Pleading Rules in Antitrust Cases: A Return To Fact 
Pleading?,  21 REV. LITIG. 1, 11 (2002). However, it is a valid concern for any 
large class action. 
300 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 
489 (2008) (noting the rising costs of class action litigation and suggesting 
amending civil pleading standards as a potential solution).  
301 Parkinson, supra note 49, at 1230. 
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chances of creating a variance in damages.”302 In a court adhering 
to a strict Individualized Proof approach, every additional injured 
plaintiff represents a net benefit to the defendant. In most cases, 
each successive harmed plaintiff would not pursue a suit on his or 
her own.303 At the same time, the greater the number of injured 
parties, the greater the variance in damages among members of the 
class.304 This, in turn, would chip away at the “perfect uniformity 
of a proffered class,” and make certification under a demanding 
Individualized Proof regime a less likely result.305 
The Individualized Proof approach is also susceptible to 
criticism on grounds that it overlooks potential benefits of judicial 
economy. This benefit occurs when courts are able to try 
numerous, relatively minor claims at once, as opposed to hundreds 
or thousands of separate actions. 306 As the Global Peace approach 
cases show, this argument appears to have particular force when 
the parties agree to pursue settlement.307  
Critics of the Individualized Proof approach also warn that a 
stringent pre-certification review can lead to previewing the merits 
of a case before trial.308  Objectors argue this amounts to judicial 
“overreaching,”309 or usurping “the jury’s role to weigh and 
                                                            
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 671 (2014) (“Rule 23(b)(3) was meant to achieve 
judicial economy, promote decisional consistency, and enable private 
enforcement of the substantive law where individual suits were not cost-
justified.”). 
307 See supra Part III.B. Yet it should be reiterated that the Supreme Court 
has endorsed a more rigorous Rule 23 approach when settlement is proposed. 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) (stating that Rule 
23(b)(3) demands “undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement 
context”); Green, supra note 25, at 1779. 
308 See generally Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 751, 782 (2012); Steig D. Olson, “Chipping Away”: The Misguided 
Trend Toward Resolving Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification 
Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935, 935 (2009). 
309 Campos, supra note 308, at 782. 
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adjudicate conflicting evidence,”310 at a stage where all that is 
sought to be determined is the procedural question of certification.  
Others respond that this argument is overstated.311 As Professor 
Linda S. Mullenix argues, judges have proven perfectly capable in 
limiting the appropriate inquiry to “whether the proposed action 
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 and nothing more.”312 
Moreover, in the absence of a more focused inquiry, both parties 
“have wide latitude to inject frivolous” arguments to “bolster or 
undermine a finding of predominance.”313 When the certification 
determination touches upon an underlying legal issue in a claim or 
defense, it might therefore be optimal for the court to address it.  
 
2. The Arguments for and Against the Global Peace 
Approach 
 
The Global Peace rationale relies on notions of manageability 
and judicial efficiency as well as the purported contractual nature 
of class action settlements.314 A key feature of the approach is the 
hesitancy to engage in a critical review of pre-certification 
pleadings.315 This is buttressed by the belief that “class 
certification simply provides a procedural means to address civil 
wrongdoing on a mass scale.”316 Proponents emphasize that Rule 
                                                            
310 Klonoff, supra note 68, at 756. 
311 See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 263, at 639–40 (attempting to rebut the 
argument that enhanced certification standards lead to impermissible pre-trial 
merits reviews); Anthony F. Fata, Doomsday Delayed: How the Court’s Party-
Neutral Certification Standards in Wal-Mart v. Dukes Actually Helps Plaintiffs, 
62 DEPAUL L. REV. 675, 684–87 (2013) (arguing that “Rule 23 proceedings are 
not a dress rehearsal for trial,” but, as a practical matter, “litigants will continue 
to put their spin on the merits in class certification proceedings”).  
312 Mullenix, supra note 263, at 639–40. 
313 Bone & Evans, supra note 5, at 1269. 
314 See e.g. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 312 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(Scirica, J., concurring) (“[A] district court’s certification of a settlement simply 
recognizes the parties’ deliberate decision to bind themselves according to 
mutually agreed-upon terms without engaging in any substantive adjudication of 
the underlying cause of action.”). 
315 See id. at 305 (“Rule 23 makes clear that a district court has limited 
authority to examine the merits when conducting the certification inquiry.”).  
316 Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement 
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23 is designed only to answer the threshold question of 
certification. Weighing the merits at this preliminary stage can lead 
to attacks of the underlying legal theories in a manner more 
appropriately suited for trial.317 
The Global Peace approach places significance on the 
distinction between litigation and settlement classes in applying the 
predominance inquiry. An overemphasis on this distinction, 
however, overlooks “the broader concerns about cohesion, 
leverage, and fairness” that often arise in large, class action 
settlements.318  Many scholars point to issues of agency costs in 
class action litigation. This occurs when “lawyers who act as 
agents for the class have financial incentives to negotiate 
settlements that prioritize their own interests at the expense of class 
members’ interests.”319 As Professor Erichson points out, a “class 
action settlement binds all members of the certified class even 
though virtually none of the class members have agreed to it.”320 
Nevertheless, courts relying on this approach have been willing to 
apply a traditional contract law gloss over large class action 
settlements as justification of either binding the class, as the Third 
Circuit did in Sullivan,321 or preventing defendants from revoking 
their deals ex post, as was the driving force behind the Fifth 
Circuit’s BP decisions upholding the agreement.322 In either case, 
courts applying this standard may sidestep what can be important, 
                                                            
Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1873 
(2006). 
317 See, e.g., Olson, supra note 308, at 935–37 (criticizing inquiries into 
underlying merits at certification); Klonoff, supra note 68, at 731 (finding that 
engaging in the merits at the certification stage results in “experienced class 
action defense counsel [that] can frequently identify a number of promising 
arguments to defeat certification, even in fairly routine cases”). 
318 Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 951, 981 (2014) [hereinafter Erichson, The Problem Of 
Settlement]. 
319 Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New 
Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1015 (2005).  
320 Erichson, The Problem of Settlement, supra note 318, at 967. 
321 Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 312 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., 
concurring). 
322 In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 818 
(5th Cir. 2014). 
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merits-based evaluations. When invoked selectively, this standard 
yields a “patchwork of discretionary decisions difficult to justify 
on principled grounds.”323  
 
B. The Proposed Amendment and Its Key Components  
 
In shaping its amendment to CAFA, Congress should adopt a 
modified Individualized Proof approach to certifying all class 
actions, including those to be certified for settlement only. This 
amendment should include three components. First, it must ensure 
that all members can prove with particularity the elements giving 
rise to their individual claims. Second, exceptions are necessary for 
cases where such proof is impracticable. Finally, preliminary 
judgments324 should be provided in cases where courts grant an 
exception.  
 
1. Adding Particularity to the Predominance Review 
 
A stringent standard of proof at the certification stage comports 
with the Supreme Court’s recent precedent. Most recently, in 
Comcast Corporation v. Behrend, the Supreme Court specifically 
addressed the degree of stringency needed to evaluate Rule 
23(b)(3)’s predominance question as it pertains to individualized 
damage calculations.325 There, the Court repeated its position in 
Wal-Mart and Amchem, stating, “[i]f anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 23(a)” 
                                                            
323 See Bone & Evans, supra note 5, at 1254. As Professors Bone and 
Evans point out, judges tempted to “skirt over technical and complex evidence,” 
especially in cases of settlement, where decisions are insulated from appellate 
review, run counter to the “intent and purpose” of Rule 23, which has been 
described as serving to further “the twin policies” of efficiency and deterrence. 
Id. at 1260, 1331. 
324 This term refers to a procedure identified by Professor Geoffrey P. 
Miller, which is described in greater detail below, and essentially asks judges to 
engage in non-binding threshold merits determinations, which either party may 
object to. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 
165 (2010). 
325 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432–33 (2013).  
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and places upon courts a “duty to take a ‘close look’ at whether 
common questions predominate over individual ones.” 326  
A particularity standard shifts the focus away from generalized 
claims and puts the onus on the sufficiency of the facts.327 In the 
class action context, where the stakes are so large, it is important 
for claims to be rooted in sufficient factual bases.328 This attempts 
to reduce the “natural plaintiff’s instinct to be over-inclusive in 
framing classes.”329 In fact, a particularity requirement strives to 
impose a notion of procedural fairness. Nearly every class action 
that is certified will settle before trial.330 These settlement 
negotiations can be enhanced with procedural safeguards that 
require plaintiffs to support their claims with adequate evidence, 
prior to certification.  
A particularity standard is already employed within the context 
of pleading fraud or mistake under Federal Rule 9(b). Fraud claims 
have been “understood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation.”331 
The standard was justified in part to “protect defendants from 
sweeping fishing expeditions under the pretext of a lawsuit, as well 
as specious allegations.”332 Those most critical of the rule contend 
                                                            
326 Id. at 1432. 
327 See Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, Global Civil Procedure Trends 
in the Twenty-First Century, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011) 
(suggesting that a particularity standard requires plaintiffs to plead a greater 
level of factual detail).  
328 Nagareda, Common Answers, supra note 92, at 152 (“As a descriptive 
matter, class certification stands not as a mere judicial byway on the road toward 
full-fledged trial on the merits but, almost invariably, as the last significant 
judicial checkpoint on the road toward settlement.”); see also Mullenix, supra 
note 263, at 632 (“Once the serious consequences of class certification are 
embraced, it follows that all actors involved should be required to produce and 
secure as reliable a record as necessary to ensure that a court has appropriate 
information upon which to make a serious class certification decision.”).  
329 Miller, supra note 324, at 322. 
330 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements 
and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 812 (2010) (observing 
that “virtually all cases certified as class actions and not dismissed before trial 
end in settlement”). 
331 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007).  
332 Emily T. Chen, Depressing Diagnosis: Stringent Particularity 
Requirement of the Rule 9(B) Pleading Standard as a Critical Bar to Off-Label 
Promotion Fraud Whistleblowers, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 333, 353 (2014).  
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that it dismisses otherwise colorable claims that do not measure up 
to the standard.333 Yet the rule remains in place and its application 
has shown that courts do not treat the particularity standard as a 
death knell to otherwise legitimate claims.334 
Support for a particularity standard requires addressing two 
objections to heightened certification procedures. The first 
contention is that enhancing the degree of pre-certification proof 
leads to expensive discovery that effectively prevents access to the 
courts.335 A particularity standard does add a degree of diligence 
on behalf of counsel prior to initiating the action, but it does not 
require more spending and does not aim to deter legitimate 
claims.336 Attorneys on both the class and defense bar already 
                                                            
333 See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Reconsidering Federal Civil Rule 9(B): Do We 
Need Particularized Pleading Requirements in Fraud Cases?, 104 F.R.D. 143, 
147–50 (1985) (describing the drawbacks of 9(b)’s pleading standard). Professor 
Jeff Sovern writes: “if the pleader lacks access to the information omitted from 
the complaint, dismissal seems a draconian result. Such a pleader must make his 
case before engaging in discovery—often an impossible task—rather than 
pursuing the normal course of engaging in discovery in making his case,” 
thereby potentially allowing “a guilty defendant to hide behind insufficient 
pleadings to prevent the truth from emerging.” Id at 154–55.  
334 Morwenna Borden, Particulars of Particularity: Alleging Scienter and 
the Proper Application of Rule 9(B) to Duty-Based Misrepresentations, 98 
Minn. L. Rev. 1110, 1118–19 (2014).  Borden observes that while courts “vary 
in their precise application” of the standard, they “have found numerous ways 
for a fraud claim to meet the particularity requirement.” Id.     
335 See Mullenix, supra note 263, at 640  (describing these concerns as dual 
critiques of enhanced certification standards).  
336 With a more rigorous approach to Rule 23(b)(3), “considerable pre-
institution attention must be paid by counsel to the composition and definition of 
the class as well as the substantive claims to be advanced.” Miller, supra note 
208, at 322. Here, it should also be noted that, for some, class actions have been 
viewed as a battle between “David”—the class comprised of financially 
disadvantaged, small-claims plaintiffs—versus “Goliath”—the corporate 
defendant. See Andrew J. Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Actions and Legal 
Strategy, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 319, 331(2011) (citing cases in the Third and 
Fourth Circuits and evoking such imagery). While the corporate defendant will 
still likely outspend the class, the traditional “David vs. Goliath” dynamic has 
changed. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability 
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 339 (2010). The past two decades have seen 
a tremendous increase in low-risk, high-reward class actions financed by third-
party investors, often in the amount of tens of millions of dollars. Id. at 339–41 
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engage in costly discovery concerning pre-trial certification.337 A 
particularity requirement does not seek to impose more evidentiary 
digging. Instead, it demands that attorneys apply “measured 
evidentiary standards to their offer to the court.”338  
A second objection to a heightened pleading standard is that it 
can lead courts to address disputes that delve into the genuine 
merits of the litigation.339 There is concern that heightened 
certification inquiries “effectively converts a class certification 
motion into a minitrial before trial.”340 A particularity standard 
would urge lawyers to refine the record before certification to hone 
in on a showing of predominance. It thereby seeks to curb 
unnecessary “probing behind the pleadings,” rather than invite 
it.341 Moreover, Professors Robert Bone and David Evans are 
correct to point out that it would be foolish to “believe the current 
system completely insulates its procedural rules from a substantive 
review.”342 The Supreme Court has acknowledged and endorsed 
the need for courts to engage in assessments of the underlying 
merits when those substantive issues are relevant to the Rule 23 
requirements.343 A particularity standard would in no way alter this 
established precedent. 
  
2. The Need for Exceptions  
 
Congress should allow exemptions for certain cases when 
members are unable to meet the standard for particularized 
                                                            
(describing the nature of third party litigation financing in the United States and 
elsewhere, and discussing its policy concerns).  
337 Mullenix, supra note 263, at 640. 
338 Id. at 641. 
339 See generally Olson, supra note 308 (criticizing courts for engaging in 
resolution of “bona fide disputes about the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims when 
deciding whether certification is warranted”). 
340 Mullenix, supra note 263, at 639. 
341 Id. at 639–41 (quoting Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 
(2011)) (arguing that heightened evidentiary requirements at certification 
mitigate merits-based review).  
342 See Bone & Evans, supra note 5, at 1283.  
343 See supra Part I.D. 
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proof.344 This exception is most appropriate in cases where the 
benefits of bringing a class action outweigh the costs of denial for 
failure to meet the standard. Many civil rights and employment 
class actions are driven by their considerable social value, but 
might be especially susceptible to issues of class-wide proof.345 
This is true in employment discrimination class actions alleging 
company-wide policies and practices that discriminate on the basis 
of race or gender.346 The example of discrimination cases does not 
attempt to draw a bright line test as to which cases would fall into 
this exception. Rather, courts should make a series of 
considerations in determining when these exceptions should apply. 
The type of case is paramount. The nature of the injury, and 
whether it is capable of factual proof, is another.  
Even in a relatively small class, anti-discrimination claims are 
difficult to prove with factual, non-anecdotal evidence.347 Meeting 
a heightened predominance requirement, then, can turn the 
certification inquiry into a battle of statisticians.348 This analysis 
may also be difficult for juries and judges to follow.349 Moreover, 
as compared to economic or physical loss caused by tortious or 
fraudulent conduct, for example, discrimination cases allege an 
                                                            
344 See Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More 
Functional Rule 23, 46 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1097, 1118 (2013) (arguing that 
erroneous certification denials of civil rights class actions pose serious risks of 
high social costs). 
345 See supra Part I.C.3 for a discussion of why Title VII claims generally 
face a steep burden to certification. 
346 See Winnie Chau, Something Old, Something New, Something 
Borrowed, Something Blue and a Silver Sixpence for Her Shoe: Dukes v. Wal-
Mart & Sex Discrimination Class Actions, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 969, 
1001 (2006) (describing the substantial value in allowing certification of 
employment discrimination class actions despite issues of individualized proof). 
347 See Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, supra note 81, 
at 629 (“[A]s the class decreases in size, so too does the available pool of 
anecdotal evidence. Thus, the named plaintiff of a small class may well find it 
difficult to present sufficient proof of any kind.”). 
348 See id. at 628–29 (describing that certification decisions in employment 
discrimination cases hinge on the quality of statistical proof). 
349 Peter M. Panken, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., Statistical Pitfalls in 
Age Discrimination Cases, ALI-CLE Course Materials, SU015 ALI-CLE 1339 
(2012). 
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injury that is quite possibly incapable of sound calculation.350 The 
appropriate certification standard for these cases is the subject of 
much debate, and is not the focus of this Note.351  Yet 
discrimination cases provide one example of the type of injury that 
might warrant the use of an exception. In any case, these 
exceptions should be wielded in a pragmatic, prudential fashion.  
 
3. Preliminary Judgments 
 
Congress should require preliminary judgments for cases that 
are subject to the exemption. These preliminary judgments would 
clarify the extent to which Rule 23(b)(3) requirements have been 
met. In a 2010 article, Professor Geoffrey P. Miller describes 
preliminary judgments as “tentative judicial assessment[s] of the 
merits of a case or any part of a case.”352 Certification decisions 
are, by and large, determinations of discretion.353 However, as 
noted above, choosing to allow an exception from a particularity 
standard would implicate an added degree of discretion on behalf 
of the court. Through requiring preliminary judgments, courts will 
provide “direct, honest, and systematic”354 representations as to 
                                                            
350 See Klonoff, supra note 68, at 748, 824 (comparing securities fraud and 
Title VII class actions and noting that the former often presents readily 
calculable damages).  
351 There are many articles addressing the appropriate degree of pleading in 
employment discrimination class actions. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Class 
Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. 
REV. 441 (2013) (urging the Supreme Court to reject heightened pleading 
because of its perceived effect of deterring employment discrimination cases); 
Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1613 (2011) (discussing the difficulties practitioners and 
plaintiffs face in framing their complaints, specifically, the sufficient level of 
proof required in employment discrimination cases). 
352 See Miller, supra note 324, at 165. Professor Miller uses the term 
preliminary judgments to mean non-binding threshold merits determinations. Id.  
He argues that preliminary judgments can alleviate many of the barriers faced by 
parties at settlement, while also serving the aims of transparency, consistency, 
and fairness. Id. 
353 See Wolff, supra note 85 (describing how courts have “broad 
discretion” in deciding whether a class action will be certified). 
354 Miller, supra note 324, at 168. 
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their findings on the purported class’ compliance with Rule 23.  
In practice, a preliminary judgment would be non-preclusive 
and non-final.355 It would serve the valuable function of providing 
litigating parties (as well as future litigants) a necessary evaluation 
of the class and case.356 This can be beneficial to future claimants 
by serving notice of the type of proof that works, and that which 
does not, before they chose to file for certification. It also engages 
the court in creating a written account of why the proffered class is 
exempt from a heightened particularity standard. It has been 
observed that when decision makers can state “the principles upon 
which [the decision] relie[s]. . .the very act of providing them may 
engender respect as well by treating the losing litigants and the 
public at large as deserving of an explanation.”357 Even when 
exceptions are granted, preliminary judgments create a written 
record that maintains the focus on compliance with the 
predominance inquiry.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Without a clear standard governing Rule 23(b)(3) 
determinations, class certification jurisprudence will continue to 
diverge. Although Congress failed to establish any such standard 
when it passed CAFA, the inconsistency among circuits harms the 
legitimacy of the class action vehicle as a tool for ensuring 
                                                            
355 Once made, preliminary judgments will not become final until the 
losing part makes use of its opportunity to object, with or without cause, “in 
which case the judgment would be vacated and the case would proceed 
according to ordinary rules of procedure.” Id. 
356 See id. at 186 (explaining that preliminary judgments may increase the 
supply of information available to future litigants).  
357 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Even More Honest Than Ever Before: 
Abandoning Pretense and Recreating Legitimacy in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 384 (1995).  In addition, preliminary 
judgments might prove valuable in settlement negotiations. As Professor Miller 
points out, “[a]lthough settlement negotiations would still progress in the usual 
way . . . the range of disagreement would be significantly constrained by the fact 
of the judgment. Overall, therefore, the preliminary judgment could assist in 
overcoming signaling effects that interfere with settlement bargaining.” Miller, 
supra note 324, at 176. 
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accountability, equity, and efficiency.358 Rule 23(b)(3) ensures that 
class actions can be brought with “economy of effort and 
uniformity of result” without sacrificing “undue dilution of 
procedural safeguards” for both class members and defendants.359  
Congress must amend CAFA to prevent these important aims from 
becoming nothing more than hollow promises.  
 
                                                            
358 See Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 
509 (2011) (describing the three “identifiable policies” of class actions as 
“accountability, efficiency, and equity”). 
359 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 
390 (1966). Benjamin Kaplan served as the reporter to the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules from its inception through 1966, helping draft subdivision (b)(3) 
of Rule 23 in 1966.  
